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SHOULD STATES BAN THE USE OF NON-POSITIVE INTERVENTIONS IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION? RE-EXAMINING POSITIVE BEHAVIOR
SUPPORTS UNDER THE IDEA
Elizabeth A. Shaver*

I. INTRODUCTION
It is a bedrock principle of special education law that each disabled child is entitled to an
“individualized education program”1 that will meet that child’s “unique needs.”2 In Bryant v.
New York State Education Department,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit issued a decision that could have far-reaching implications for this bedrock principle. In
Bryant, the Second Circuit held that the provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA)4 permit a state educational agency to ban the use of non-positive behavior
interventions.5 Scientific research demonstrates that such interventions can effectively treat
severe self-injurious and aggressive behavior in disabled children.6 By endorsing a statewide ban
*
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1

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(a) (2012).

2

Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A).

3

692 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2012).

4

20 U.S.C. §1400.

5

Bryant, 692 F.3d at 215.

6

See id. at 221 (Sullivan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing studies that “describe

on certain behavior interventions, the Second Circuit’s ruling severely impacts a child’s right to
an individualized educational program tailored to meet that child’s unique needs.
The plaintiffs in Bryant challenged the authority of the New York State Educational
Department (NYSED) to issue regulations that prohibit the use of “aversive interventions”7 for
children who are eligible for special education under IDEA.8 The Second Circuit held that IDEA
permits NYSED to adopt a statewide “policy that relies on positive behavioral interventions
only.”9
The decision in Bryant is deeply flawed for several reasons. First, the Second Circuit
erred when it held that a state educational agency, like NYSED, may issue regulations banning
the use of non-positive interventions within the state. In fact, IDEA explicitly directs educators to
“consider the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports[] and other strategies” to
address behavior that may impede the child’s learning.10 By ruling that IDEA permits a state to
preclude the use of any non-positive interventions, the Second Circuit impermissibly wrote the
words “and other strategies”11 out of the statute.
Second, the Second Circuit erred when it held that the Supreme Court’s decision in

the need for aversive interventions in certain instances” (emphasis in original)).
7

Id. at 210 (majority opinion); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 8, §§ 19.5(b)(1), 200.22(e)

(2014).
8

692 F.3d at 210; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 8, § 19.5(b)(1)

9

Bryant, 692 F.3d at 213.

10

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) (2012) (emphasis added) (listing special factors that a child’s IEP

team must consider).
11

Id.

2

Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley12 requires deference
to NYSED’s educational choices made through the agency rule-making process.13 In Rowley, the
Court held that courts should defer to educators’ choice of methodology only when that choice
has been made as to a particular child and has been the subject of a due process hearing initiated
by the child’s parents.14 Rowley does not require the judiciary to defer to methodology choices
that are made at the state agency level via the agency rule-making process.
Finally, the Second Circuit misunderstood the science of applied behavior analysis. The
court stated that a ban on non-positive interventions “prohibit[ed] only consideration of a single
method of treatment without foreclosing other options.”15 Non-positive interventions, however,
are not a “single method” among many equally available methods. Rather, behavior interventions
exist along a hierarchy pursuant to which positive-only interventions are considered less
intrusive than non-positive interventions and are to be implemented earlier in the hierarchy.16 If
positive-only interventions are ineffective to treat severe behavior and non-positive interventions

12

458 U.S. 176 (1982).

13

Bryant, 692 F.3d at 216.

14

458 U.S. at 208.

15

Bryant, 692 F.3d at 214.

16

See, e.g., Dorothea C. Lerman & Christina M. Vorndran, On the Status of Knowledge for Using

Punishment: Implications for Treating Behavior Disorders, 4 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 431, 431–
464 (2002) (addressing the research on punishment and its effect in clinical settings); Sarah-Jeanne Salvy
et al., Contingent Electric Shock (SIBIS) and a Conditioned Punisher Eliminate Severe Head Banging in
a Preschool Child, 19 BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 59, 59–72 (2004) (discussing several non-positive
behavioral interventions including contingent electric shock).

3

are banned by the state law, then the behavior may become untreatable. Moreover, research
demonstrates that, for some children, an effective intervention plan will require a combination of
both positive and non-positive interventions.17 A ban on non-positive interventions could prevent
such children from receiving the appropriate multi-component behavior plan.18
IDEA’s requirements for the use of behavioral interventions likely will be addressed
when Congress next amends and reauthorizes IDEA. Many disability rights organizations have
advocated for legislative action that would ban the use of “aversive interventions.”19 In recent
years, members of Congress have introduced several bills designed to create federal educational
17

Salvy, supra note 16, at 60, 70.

18

See infra Part II(E) (discussing the positive aspects of a multi-component behavior plan).

19

See, e.g., Restraint and Seclusion (APRAIS), TASH, http://tash.org/advocacy-issues/coalitions-

partnerships/aprais/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2014). Non-positive or aversive interventions are not
synonymous with seclusion or restraint, although some disability rights organizations do define “aversive
interventions” to include seclusion and restraint (as well as other forms of abusive interventions). Council
of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA), Unsafe in the Schoolhouse: Abuse of Children With
Disabilities, COPAA (May 27, 2009),
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.copaa.org/resource/collection/662B1866-952D-41FA-B7F3D3CF68639918/UnsafeCOPAAMay_27_2009.pdf. However, seclusion or restraint should be used only
in emergency situations that involve an imminent risk of serious physical injury to the child or others. See
United States Dep’t of Educ., Restraint and Seclusion: Resource Document, (May 2012), ED.GOV 3
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/seclusion/restraints-and-seclusion-resources.pdf (stating that restraint and
seclusion are not “routine” measures). Behavioral interventions, in contrast, are designed by professionals
to address problem behavior exhibited by a specific child. The use of a particular behavioral intervention
on a systematic basis differs from the emergency use of seclusion and restraint.

4

policy on the appropriate use of aversive behavioral interventions in a school setting.20 However,
none of that proposed legislation has been enacted. Thus, the next IDEA reauthorization process
will be the opportunity for Congress to craft educational policy on this important topic.
This Article contends that a complete ban on the use of non-positive behavioral
interventions violates a core tenet of the IDEA: specifically that each child with a disability is
entitled to an individualized education program designed to meet that child’s unique needs. Part I
of this Article provides a summary of applied behavior analysis and an overview of the “positive
behavior supports” (PBS) movement. Part II sets forth the history of IDEA and the statutory
provisions that address the use of behavior interventions. Part III discusses various states’
regulations regarding the use of non-positive, or aversive, interventions, including the New York
regulations. Part IV examines the litigation that was filed after the New York regulations were
issued. Part V details the weaknesses of the Second Circuit’s ruling in Bryant and its potential
consequences on the educational programming of children with severe behavior. Part VI
recommends various ways in which Congress could amend IDEA to clarify the statutory
references to behavioral interventions techniques.

II. APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND POSITIVE BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS AND
SUPPORTS
A. Basic Principles of Applied Behavior Analysis
Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) is a science “devoted to the understanding and
improvement of human behavior.”21 The title, ABA, is significant. The word “applied” indicates
20

See infra Part II(D) (discussing the bills and senate reports).

21

JOHN. O. COOPER ET AL., APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 3 (2d ed. 2007). The Cooper text, known

as the “White Book,” is an iconic textbook in the field of Applied Behavior Analysis. Id. at xv (Preface).

5

that ABA is designed to bring about changes in socially significant behavior that will improve a
person’s daily life in terms of social interaction, self-care, vocation, and recreational activities.22
The word “behavior” requires that the behavior analyst23 precisely define a particular behavior
and accurately measure changes in that behavior.24 Finally, the word “analysis” requires the
behavior analyst to determine that there is a causal relationship between any intervention chosen
and changes in behavior.25 One of the hallmarks of good “analysis” is the ability to reliably (or
repeatedly) demonstrate a change in behavior when an intervention is introduced.26
A core concept of ABA is the “three-term contingency[,]” or the “ABCs,” of behavior
analysis.27 The ABCs can be described as follows: the occurrence of a particular behavior (B)
will depend on both the antecedent conditions (A) that exist before the behavior occurs and the
consequences (C) resulting from the behavior.28 When examining behavior, an initial
requirement is to determine both the antecedent to the behavior and the consequences that

22

Id. at 16.

23

The term “behavior analyst” as used in this Article refers broadly to professionals who use ABA

principles in their field and specifically includes school psychologists. Because behavior analysis
principles are increasingly applied in school, “[e]ffective school psychologists are apt to be good behavior
analysts.” Ruth A. Ervin & Kristal E. Ehrhardt, Behavior Analysis and School Psychology, in HANDBOOK
OF APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS

113, 128 (John Austin & James E. Carr eds., 2000).

24

COOPER, supra note 21, at 16.

25

Id. at 17.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 41–42.

28

Id. at 42.

6

naturally (i.e., in the absence of any planned intervention) occur whenever the behavior is
displayed.29 Once the ABCs of the behavior are known, interventions can be devised to reduce
problem behavior and increase appropriate behavior.30
Another essential premise of ABA is that all behavior, either appropriate or problematic,
serves a function for the individual who exhibits the behavior. A child who is disruptive in class,
for example, may engage in the behavior because it gets the teacher’s attention. The function of
such behavior is attention-seeking, which could include a desire either for positive attention
(praise) or negative attention (scolding or reprimand).31 Another common function of such
behavior is escape from task.32 A child who feels overwhelmed by a particular demand may
engage in problem behavior as a means to interrupt the demand being placed on the child.33
Problem behavior also may serve the function of gaining the child access to desired tangible
items or activities.34 Finally, for some children with disabilities, problem behavior can serve a
function known as automatic reinforcement, where the behavior provides internal feedback that

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Ruth A. Ervin et al., A Descriptive Analysis and Critique of Empirical Literature on School-based

Functional Assessment, 30 SCH. PSYCH. REV. 193, 203–04 (2001); Lynn Koegel et al., Interventions for
Children with Autistic Spectrum Disorders in Inclusive School Settings, 19 COGNITIVE & BEHAV. PRAC.
401, 402 (2012).
32

DANIEL CRIMMINS ET AL., POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR STUDENTS WITH BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS

74–75 (2007); Ervin, supra note 31, at 203–04.
33

CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 8–9.

34

Id. at 74–75.

7

the child desires.35 That feedback can be sensory, as in the case of a child who engages in headbanging, rocking, hand-flapping, inappropriate vocalizations, hair-pulling, or self-biting.36
When first examining a particular behavior exhibited by a child, the behavior analyst will
undertake a process known as a Functional Behavioral Assessment (FBA). An FBA is the
process of identifying and defining a particular behavior, its function, the antecedent events that
reliably predict the occurrence of the behavior, and the consequences or events that in the
absence of interventions may further the function of the behavior.37 A properly conducted FBA
could reveal, for example, that the antecedent to a particular behavior is a task that overwhelms
the child and that one consequence of the behavior, such as being removed from class, serves the
function of allowing the child to escape from the task. Because the consequence furthers the
function of the behavior, the behavior analyst would say that the consequence “maintains” the
behavior. 38
Armed with the results of a comprehensive FBA, the behavior analyst can begin to devise
a behavioral intervention plan (BIP) that alters antecedents to the behavior to keep the behavior
from occurring or introduces consequences for the behavior when it occurs, or uses a
combination of both antecedents and consequences.39
35

COOPER, supra note 21, at 501–02.

36

Eileen M. Roscoe et al., A Comparison of Noncontingent Reinforcement and Sensory Extinction as

Treatments for Self-Injurious Behavior, 31 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 635 (1998).
37

COOPER, supra note 21, at 500; CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 90; H. Rutherford Turnbull III, et al.,

IDEA, Positive Behavioral Supports, and School Safety, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 445, 456 (2001).
38

Lerman & Vorndran, supra note 16, at 433.

39

COOPER, supra note 21, at 486–97 (discussing antecedent interventions).
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Antecedent-based interventions are designed to alter preexisting environmental
conditions or variables that exist or occur before a behavior is demonstrated.40 Some antecedents
to problem behavior may be “setting events,” such as lack of sleep, illness, or noise in the
environment.41 Other antecedents may be the introduction of a request or task upon the
individual, triggering the behavior.42 If the function of a problem behavior is to escape from a
task demand, the behavior analyst can change the antecedent conditions by “shortening the task,
simplifying the demands, [or] clarifying the instructions.”43 These targeted changes to antecedent
conditions are interventions that are designed to keep problem behavior from occurring.44
Consequence-based interventions are implemented when behavior occurs, with the
intention to affect the frequency with which the behavior will reoccur in the future.45
Consequences can act either to increase (in the case of an appropriate behavior) or decrease (in
the case of a problem behavior) the frequency with which behavior will occur in the future.46
There are two available consequences: reinforcement and punishment.47 A “reinforcer” is

40

Id. at 28.

41

CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 8, 109 (identifying four dimensions for setting events); George Sugai

et al., Applying Positive Behavior Support and Functional Behavioral Assessment in Schools, 2 J.
POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 131, 138 (2000).
42

CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 8; Sugai, supra note 41, at 138.

43

Koegel, supra note 31, at 403.

44

Id.

45

COOPER, supra note 21, at 33–37; CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 19.

46

Turnbull, supra note 37, at 453–454.

47

Cooper, supra note 21, at 34–37.

9

any consequence that is designed to increase the likelihood of behavior occurring in the future.48
A “punisher” is any consequence that is designed to decrease the likelihood that the behavior
will occur in the future.49
Each type of consequence can be further divided. Positive reinforcement occurs when the
behavior is followed by a consequence that will increase the likelihood of the behavior occurring
in the future.50 Positive reinforcement commonly occurs when parents verbally praise a child for
good behavior; the verbal praise will increase the likelihood that the behavior will occur more
frequently in the future. Other common forms of positive reinforcement include allowing access
to preferred items (toys or an electronic device), bits of food, hugs or “high[]fives,” and the
like.51
Negative reinforcement occurs when good behavior leads to the elimination of an
unwanted condition.52 A simple example of negative reinforcement is the ability of a child who
has done satisfactory school work to “take a break” from work. The unwanted condition—having
to do school work—is removed by virtue of the child’s satisfactory completion of a task.

48

Id. at 34.

49

Id.; CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 21.

50

COOPER, supra note 21, at 36; CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 19.

51

There are also “schedules of reinforcement,” which determine the frequency with which

reinforcement is delivered to the child. Continuous reinforcement is delivered every time the child
engages in the desired behavior, and is used most often when a child is learning a new behavior.
CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 25. Partial or intermittent reinforcement reinforces behavior occasionally,
and is used most often to maintain appropriate behavior that the child displays regularly. Id.
52

Id. at 19.

10

Punishment also can be divided into positive and negative punishment. Negative
punishment occurs when the child loses access to either desired conditions or the opportunity to
acquire desired materials for a period of time.53 For example, negative punishment occurs when a
child who does not behave appropriately loses a privilege, such as watching TV. Positive
punishment occurs when a condition is introduced to the child as a consequence of the
behavior.54 An example of positive punishment might be the requirement that a child who has
thrown objects on the floor must clean up the mess.
Intrinsically the terms “reinforcement” and “punishment” do not have any moral or social
value attached to them.55 An adult may inadvertently reinforce a behavior even when the adult is
not interacting “positively” with a child, such as the circumstances in which a child who seeks
adult attention engages in disruptive behavior, causing the adult to scream at the child.
Conversely, an adult who applies a punisher is not acting with any malice or ill will.56

53

COOPER, supra note 21, at 329.

54

Id.

55

Ron Van Houten et al., The Right to Effective Behavioral Treatment, 21 J. APPLIED BEHAV.

ANALYSIS 381, 384 (1988) (“Techniques are not considered as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ according to
whether they involve the use of antecedent rather than consequent stimuli or reinforcement rather than
punishment.”).
56

COOPER, supra note 21, at 328 (“It is important to point out that punishment is defined neither by

the actions of the person delivering the consequences…nor by the nature of those consequences.”);
Nirbhay N. Singh et al., Nonaversive and Aversive Interventions: Issues, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF
NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 3, 4
(Alan C. Repp & Nirbhay N. Singh eds., 1990) (explaining that “punishment” is a term with a technical

11

To address a specific behavior, the behavior analyst will take the results of an FBA and
design a behavioral intervention plan (BIP) that will increase appropriate behavior and reduce
inappropriate behavior as desired.57 In determining which interventions to select, professional
standards have established a hierarchy of interventions under which the behavior analyst should
select the “least restrictive” intervention that may bring about a change in the behavior.58 This
hierarchy attempts to ensure that interventions are no more intrusive to the person’s life or
independence than are necessary to produce the desired effect.59 And yet the behavior analyst
also must consider whether the least restrictive intervention will be effective to change behavior.
Choosing an intervention simply because it is less intrusive is “unacceptable … [if] available
research indicate[s] that other procedures would be more effective.”60
While intrusiveness—the extent to which an intervention affects a person’s life or
independence—is a concept as to which professional judgment might vary in any particular case,

meaning).
57

CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 89.

58

COOPER, supra note 21, at 350-51; see e.g., Gina Green, Least Restrictive Use of Reductive

Procedures: Guidelines and Competencies, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND
AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56 at 479,
479-493 (discussing the restrictive procedures of the rules that “govern the use of behavior change”).
59

COOPER, supra note 21, at 350; see also Christina M. Vorndran & Dorothea C. Lerman,

Establishing and Maintaining Treatment Effects with Less Intrusive Consequences via a Pairing
Procedure, 39 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 35, 35 (2006) (stating as a “general consensus . . . that
interventions should be designed to be as least intrusive or restrictive as possible.”).
60

Van Houten, supra note 55, at 383.
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a consensus has emerged that consequences based on reinforcement are considered less intrusive
than consequences based on punishment such that, “whenever possible,”61 the behavior analyst is
to select reinforcement consequences before punishment consequences.62 Thus, the proper
application of the least restrictive or intrusive hierarchy would dictate that a BIP would start with
a “comprehensive positive program.”63 If those positive measures do not change the problem
behavior, then the BIP might be modified to include punishment-based interventions.64
B. Early Applications of ABA Principles to Treat Severe Behavior
The most well-known researcher in the field of ABA is B.F. Skinner. Skinner, however,
primarily applied ABA principles to animals.65 The first known application of ABA principles on
61

See BACB Guidelines for Responsible Conduct for Behavior Analysts: Guideline 4.05 BEHAV.

ANALYST CERTIFICATION BD., http://bacb.com/index.php?page=57 (last visited Aug. 31, 2014)
[hereinafter BACB guidelines] (“The behavior analyst recommends reinforcement rather than punishment
whenever possible.”).
62

Id. at 4.05; COOPER, supra note 21 at 350-51; see also Stacey L. Carter & John J. Wheeler,

Considering the Intrusiveness of Interventions, 20 INT’L. J. OF SPECIAL EDUC. 136, 136–37 (2005)
(ranking interventions from Level I to Level IV).
63

Maurice A. Feldman, Balancing Freedom from Harm and Right to Treatment for Persons with

Developmental Disabilities, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE
INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56, at 261, 266.
64

Michael R. Mayton et al. Intrusiveness of Behavioral Treatments for Adults with Intellectual

Disability, 35 RES. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 54, 55 (2014) (noting that a hierarchy of intrusiveness
that progresses from least to most intrusive, as follows: reinforcement-based interventions, extinction
procedures, response cost procedures, and the use of aversive stimuli).
65

CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 18.

13

a human subject took place in 1949.66 Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, other professionals
began to apply Skinner’s principles to human behavior, resulting in many “pioneering
applications of behavior principles to education.”67 The year 1968 marked the “formal beginning
of contemporary applied behavior analysis,”68 when, among other events, the Journal of Applied
Behavior Analysis began publication.69
Some of the early applications of ABA involved disabled children who engaged in
severe, potentially life-threatening behaviors.70 Such behaviors can threaten the health and safety
of both the child and others, and cause the children to be isolated from their families and
communities, even leading to life-long institutionalization.71
A 1969 study by Ivar Lovaas and James Simmons describes the types of self-destructive
behaviors that some children exhibit:
This behavior consists primarily of “head-banging” (against walls and furniture),
“arm-banging” (against sharp corners), beating themselves on their heads or in
their faces with their fists or knees, and biting themselves on wrists, arms, and
shoulders. In some children, the self-destructive behavior can be severe enough to
66

COOPER, supra note 21, at 10–16 (describing historical underpinnings of ABA and its application

to human behavior).
67

COOPER, supra, note 21, at 14; see also CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 19 (noting that Skinner’s

work “has been replicated and extended by many other researchers and clinicians”).
68

COOPER, supra note 21, at 16.

69

Id.

70

O. Ivar Lovaas & James Q. Simmons, Manipulation of Self-Destruction in Three Retarded

Children, 3 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 143, 143 (1969).
71

Id.; Van Houten, supra note 55, at 382 (dangerous behaviors can “serve as barriers to . . .

independence or social acceptability”).
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pose a major problem for the child’s safety. Thus, one can frequently see that such
children have removed large quantities of flesh from their bodies, torn out their
nails, opened wounds in their heads, broken their noses, etc.72
Several other scientific articles detail such severe behavior.73 These articles also detail how these
behaviors isolate these children from their families and communities.74 Indeed, the longer that a
child exhibits self-injurious and aggressive behaviors, the more intractable the behavior
becomes.75 Thus, it is imperative that the child who engages in self-injurious, aggressive, or
other destructive behaviors quickly receive the most effective and appropriate intervention that
will bring about meaningful change in the child’s behavior.76
72

Lovaas & Simmons, supra note 72 (typeface altered).

73

See, e.g., Louis P. Hagopian et al., Effectiveness of Functional Communication Training with and

Without Extinction and Punishment: A Summary of 21 Inpatient Cases, 31 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS
211, 213 (1998) (detailing the self-destructive behavior exhibited in each client involved in a study
including hitting, slapping, throwing objects, and running toward an open door); Rachel H. Thompson et
al., Effects of Reinforcement for Alternative Behavior During Punishment of Self-Injury, 32 J. APPLIED
BEHAV. ANALYSIS 317, 319 (1999) (detailing the “SIB” or self-injurious behavior exhibited in each
participant in the study including hitting and other forceful contact); Ron Van Houten & Ahmos Rolider,
Recreating the Scene: An Effective Way to Provide Delayed Punishment for Inappropriate Motor
Behavior, 21 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 187, 188 (1988) (examining the aggressive behavior of two
participants in the study including biting other children and stealing small items).
74

Lovaas & Simmons, supra note 72, at 143.

75

Koegel, supra note 31, at 402 (Without appropriate interventions, challenging behaviors can

“persist across an individual’s lifespan.”).
76

Glen Dunlap et. al., Preventing Serious Behavior Problems Through Skill Development and Early

Intervention, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR

15

In early applications of ABA to treat such severe problem behavior, the concept of an
FBA had not yet been developed. Therefore, behavioral interventions often were applied in a
reactive manner to address behavior as it occurred without any preliminary determination about
the antecedent conditions to, or the function of, the behavior.77 Many of these early interventions
applied several forms of punishment consequences that were physical or painful in nature.
Among the forms of punishment that were detailed in the literature were use of noxious liquids,
sprays of water mist in the face, slapping, hitting, physical restraint, or contingent electric
shock.78 The word “aversive” began to appear in the scientific literature as an adjective to
describe the application of these techniques to address problem behavior.79 These unpleasant or
PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56, at 273, 276 (noting that problem behavior,
if untreated, becomes more intense and complex).
77

Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional Behavioral Assessments and Behavior Intervention

Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.175, 175 (2011).
78

See, e.g. Michael F. Dorsey et al., Treatment of Self-Injurious Behavior Using a Water Mist: Initial

Response Suppression and Generalization, 13 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 343, 343–53 (1980)
(examining a study which “evaluated the effects of a fine mist of water applied to the face contingent
upon self-injurious behavior”); Lovaas & Simmons, supra note 72, at 143 (discussing the use of
“straitjackets” or tying a child’s feet to his or her bed as forms of restraint); Barry A. Tanner & Marlene
Zeiler, Punishment of Self-Injurious Behavior Using Aromatic Ammonia as the Aversive Stimulus, 8 J.
APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 53, 53–57 (1975) (detailing the use of aromatic ammonia as aversive
stimuli); see also Stacey B. Seiden & Perry A. Zirkel, Aversive Therapy for Handicapped Students, 48
EDUC. L. REP. 1029, 1032–35 (1989) (reviewing the psychological literature and relevant cases).
79

CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 3 (“Aversives came into use when professionals encountered

difficulty managing seemingly intractable patterns of dangerous or destructive behavior” such as self-
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painful aversive therapies were “sometimes used inappropriately or abusively.”80
Beginning in the 1970s, the nation experienced a heightened awareness of deplorable
conditions in some institutional settings where adults and children with disabilities resided. In
1972, a television documentary on the conditions at Willowbrook State School on Staten Island,
New York, gave the public shocking video footage of naked children sitting on the floor in
overcrowded, filthy rooms or being fed by staff workers who shoveled food into the children’s
mouths using the staff workers’ hands.81 In reaction, several lawsuits were filed seeking to
reform conditions at these institutions or, alternatively, to release the institution’s residents.82
One such case, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,83 detailed some of the abusive
practices used at institutions to manage residents’ behavior, including widespread use of physical
restraints for long periods of time, the use of seclusion rooms to control residents, and physical

injury or aggression.).
80

Crighton Newsom & Kimberly A. Kroeger, Nonaversive Treatment, in CONTROVERSIAL

THERAPIES FOR DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: FAD FASHION AND SCIENCE IN PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE 405, 406 (John W. Jacobson et. al., eds. 2005).
81

Video footage of conditions at the Willowbrook State School can be found at Willowbrook State

School Exposed. Unbelievable (YouTube Video Mar. 12, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dbiYJkiX-Dg; see also David J. Rothman & Sheila M. Rothman, THE
WILLOWBROOK WARS 86–87 (1984) (detailing the squalid conditions of the Willowbrook school
including “the stench of urine and sweat” and “chronic shortages of clothing, sheets, and bedding”).
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N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Wyatt v.

Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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abuse at the hands of staff or other residents.84
In response to such revelations, both federal and state governments enacted statutes or
regulations designed to promote the rights of disabled individuals to be treated with dignity.85
C. Rise of the Positive Behavioral Interventions and Support Movement
As news reports and court cases raised public awareness about the treatment of disabled
individuals in institutional settings, behavior analysts began to debate the ethics of using
interventions that involved pain, discomfort, or undignified treatment.86 Some advocates argued
that professional ethics dictated that disabled individuals should be free from discomfort or pain,
while others argued that individuals had a right to effective treatment to treat severe behavior,
even if the treatment itself involved some pain or discomfort.87 In the 1980s, this debate among
policy makers, advocacy groups, and behavior analysts about the use of aversive interventions
became “fierce.”88 Some professionals and policy makers, including officials at the United States
Department of Education, theorized that positive-only, nonaversive interventions could provide a
behavior support structure of both effective and dignified treatment, but there was no scientific

84

Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1306–11.

85

Dennis P. Saccuzzo, Legal Regulation of Behavior Modification for Developmentally Disabled and

Other Handicapped Persons, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 27, 35–36 (1999) (discussing events leading to states’
enactment of protections for developmentally disabled individuals receiving mental health or other health
care treatment generally).
86

CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 2–3; Seiden & Zirkel, supra note 78, at 1030.
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CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 3.
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Madeleine Will, Foreword, in EDWARD G. CARR ET AL., POSITIVE BEHAVIOR SUPPORT FOR

PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: A RESEARCH SYNTHESIS xv (1999).
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research to support the use of a positive-only intervention scheme.89
Over the course of several years, the federal government, through the United States
Department of Education, spent several million dollars to fund research into the use of positive
or non-aversive approaches to managing behavior.90 This federally funded research yielded
scientific support for a positive-only behavioral intervention structure.91 Thus, the “positive
behavior support” (PBS), or “positive behavior interventions and supports” (PBIS), movement
emerged.92
One of the founding tenets of the early PBS movement was to add a “values” component
to the scientific principles of ABA.93 By adding community and social values to the science of
ABA, PBS proponents deemed certain interventions, even if effective to address problem
behavior, unacceptable on the grounds that they were “dehumanizing or degrading.”94
PBS proponents also contended that the widespread use of aversive interventions

89

Id. at xv.

90

See infra Part II(C) (explaining that the National Institute on Disability and Rehabiltation Research

(NIDRR) awarded a multimillion-dollar grant to university researchers to study Nonaversive Behavior
Management).
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A 1999 monograph was described as providing the “scientific grounds” that policy makers had

“wanted a decade ago” to justify the use of a positive-only intervention scheme. Foreword of Madeleine
Will, supra note 88, at xv.
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Edward G. Carr et al., Positive Behavioral Support: Evolution of an Applied Science, 4 J. POSITIVE

BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 4 (2002) [hereinafter “Carr 2002”]; CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 3.
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CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 4, 41; Sugai, supra note 41, at 134.
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Carr 2002, supra note 92, at 6; Sugai, supra note 41, at 134-36.
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stemmed from the belief that problem behavior was due to an individual’s unchangeable
characteristics, such as disability type, without considering extrinsic environmental factors that
might contribute to problem behavior.95 Noting that “people in community settings are
interdependent,”96 PBS proponents challenged non-disabled individuals to alter their perception
of the behavior of a disabled individual:
[T]he focus of intervention must be on changing problem context, not problem
behavior. We must move beyond blaming the victim (e.g., certain people have
problems that must be “treated”) to holding societal contexts accountable (e.g.,
certain people live in deficient environments that must be redesigned).97

This focus on problem context translated into enthusiastic adoption of the FBA process
and great emphasis on devising interventions that would modify antecedent conditions to keep
problem behavior from occurring.98 PBS proponents contended that the proactive nature of a
PBS approach could “remediate the environment[] . . . so as to prevent future occurrences of the
problem behavior.”99 Changing antecedent conditions might include changing the student’s
physical environment or daily schedule or taking steps to minimize noise or “other

95

Sugai, supra note 41, at 137.

96

Carr 2002, supra note 92, at 11.

97

Id.
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CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 3 (“One distinctive feature of the PBS movement enabled it to

supplant earlier ABA technologies that were based primarily on punishment: the emphasis on the
prominent role of function in maintaining problem behavior.”); Sugai, supra note 41, at 135–37.
99

EDWARD G. CARR ET AL., POSITIVE BEHAVIOR SUPPORT FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL

DISABILITIES 5 (1999) [hereinafter Carr 1999].
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environmental irritants.”100 Other antecedent interventions that could reduce the frequency of
problem behavior at school might involve changes to the curriculum, interspersing easy tasks
with difficult ones, and changing the complexity or number of instructions from the teacher.101
By pairing changes in antecedent conditions with positive reinforcement of appropriate
behavior, PBS proponents theorized that the frequency of appropriate behavior would increase,
leading to a natural decrease in problem behavior.102 A pure, PBS-based intervention plan thus
would not contain any affirmative intervention to address problem behavior on the theory that
problem behavior naturally would fade away once the individual understood the efficacy of
gaining positive reinforcement for appropriate behavior.103
Indeed, some PBS proponents soundly condemned the use of “aversive procedures that
address problem behaviors with reactive, crisis-driven strategies.”104 These professionals
challenged the belief that punishment was a necessary form of behavioral intervention, labeling

100

Turnbull, supra note 37, at 452.

101

Carr 1999, supra note99, at 12–14; Turnbull, supra note 37, at 452–53.
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Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 14–15. The primary focus was on changing the environment to

“increase opportunities for the display of positive behavior,” while decreasing the frequency of problem
behavior was termed an “important, but secondary, goal of PBS.” Carr 2002, supra note 92, at 4–5.
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Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 8 (“[I]mprovements in environmental conditions and repertoires of

positive behavior can produce, as a side effect, decreases in problem behavior.”).
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Carr 2002, supra note 92, at 9; Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 5 (“[U]sing aversive procedures

conforms best to a crisis management paradigm; using PBS conforms best to a prevention paradigm.”);
CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 5 (“Because it awaits the occurrence of problem behavior, reactive discipline
relies predominantly on punishment and often fails to consider the concerns of learners”).
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that position as a “myth” founded on a natural human tendency to punish offending behavior.105
These PBS proponents contended that their “proactive” approach to problem behavior would
“rende[r] the traditional use of punishment obsolete and unnecessary.”106
However, early PBS proponents had some disagreements about whether certain
interventions were indeed “positive.”107 A good illustration of this difficulty involved two forms
of reinforcement known as “DRO” and “DRA.”108 A “DRO” (“Differential Reinforcement of
Other behavior”) delivers positive reinforcement to a child who does not engage in problem
behavior for a specified period of time, even if the child is not otherwise engaged in a specified
appropriate behavior.109 A “DRA” (“Differential Reinforcement of Alternative behavior”)
delivers reinforcement when the child engages in a specified alternative behavior that is designed
to replace the problem behavior.110 Even though a child could be reinforced through both
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Anne M. Donnellan & Gary W. Lavigna, Myths About Punishments, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE

OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,

supra note 56, at 35.
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Id. at 33.
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“sugar coating” to make PBS sound more appealing. See James A. Mulick & Eric M. Butter, Positive
Behavior Support: A Paternalistic Utopian Delusion, in CONTROVERSIAL THERAPIES FOR
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: FAD, FASHION AND SCIENCE IN PROFESSIONAL, supra note 80, at 385,
390–91 (“Sugar coatings make you feel nice.”).
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Id. at 14.
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Id. at 15.
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intervention forms, some PBS proponents argued that a DRO was not positive because “frequent
display of problem behavior results in repeated omission of positive reinforcers, an aversive
event.”111 In the view of those behavior analysts, a DRO operated as a form of punishment.112
Still other PBS proponents disagreed, arguing that a DRO should be considered a “positive”
intervention.113
The “DRA/DRO controversy”114 is only illustrative of the debate about whether
particular interventions are acceptable.115 It is a good example, however, of the difficulty of
111

Id. at 14. For an in-depth analysis of whether DRO is best classified as reinforcement or

punishment, see Ahmos Rolider & Ron Van Houten, The Role of Reinforcement in Reducing
Inappropriate Behavior: Some Myths and Misconceptions, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF
NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
supra note 56, at 119, 119–22.
112

Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 14.

113

Donnellan & LaVigna, supra note 105, at 39 (identifying DRO as a positive strategy).
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Mulick, supra note 107, at 394.
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There were similar debates about other intervention techniques. See, e.g., CRIMMINS, supra note

32, at 24 (time-out may be used, but can be misused if not monitored carefully); Alan C. Repp & Kathryn
G. Karsh, A Taxonomic Approach to the Nonaversive Treatment of Maladaptive Behavior of Persons with
Developmental Disabilities, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE
INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56, at 331, 332
(identifying time-out and overcorrection as aversives); Tristan M. Smith, When and When Not to
Consider the Use of Aversive Interventions in the Behavioral Treatment of Autistic Children, in
PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56, at 287, 288 (time-out and overcorrection differ from
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labeling behavior interventions as “positive.”
D. PBS Evolves into a “Framework” for School-Wide Behavioral Support System
Although “developed initially as an alternative to [the use of] aversive interventions,”116
in the 2000s, the PBS movement began to “shift[] focus”117 to become a set of practices and
systems for school-wide behavioral support for all children.118 PBS now encompasses much
more than a means to devise appropriate interventions to address a single student’s behavioral
issues.119 Rather, PBS is a universal framework through which educators can select and
implement behavioral practices on a school-wide basis to improve the behavior of all students.120
aversives because they do not involve physical punishment); Turnbull, supra note 37, at 479 (setting
several conditions under which time-out may be acceptable).
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Sugai, supra note 41, at 133.
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George Sugai & Brandi Simonsen, Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports: History,
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http://www.pbis.org/common/cms/files/pbisresources/PBIS_revisited_June19r_2012.pdf
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Id.
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Sugai, supra note 41, at 133 (PBS has grown from “an intervention approach for individual

students to an intervention approach for entire schools”); see also What is School-Wide Positive Behavior
Interventions & Supports? OSEP Center on Positive Behav. Interventions & Supports PBIS.ORG (May
13, 2009) http://www.pbis.org/school/what_is_swpbs.aspx (“More importantly, SWPBS is NOT a
curriculum, intervention, or practice, but IS a decision making framework that guides selection,
integration, and implementation of the best evidence-based academic and behavioral practices for
improving important academic and behavior outcomes for all students.”) (emphasis in original) (typeface
altered).
120

CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 4–5 (describing PBS as a framework to be implemented on a school-
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System-wide PBS practices include discipline policies, safe-schools initiatives, social-skills
training programs, and anti-bullying and anti-harassment efforts.121 The use of a PBS framework
in schools is said to provide many benefits that range far beyond the specific occurrence of a
problem behavior in a particular child with a disability, including improving academic
achievement school wide (because time devoted to behavioral issues in the classroom is reduced)
and reducing school violence, bullying, and harassment.122
The current PBS framework takes the entire school community and divides it into three
“zones” of support. These zones are represented by a pyramid, where the pyramid is divided into
three areas: (1) primary prevention, (2) secondary prevention, and (3) tertiary prevention.123 The
largest zone, primary prevention, is a school-wide framework for all students and staff and is
applicable across all school settings.124 Secondary prevention efforts are directed at “at-risk”
students who have not yet begun to engage in problem behaviors.125 Tertiary, or “red-zone,”
prevention strategies are to be implemented for students who currently exhibit problem

wide and community-wide basis); see also Sugai & Simonsen, supra note 117, at 2.
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CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 38–39.
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students are students without serious problem behaviors, five to fifteen percent of students are “at-risk”
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CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 39–40.
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behaviors.126
Within this framework, however, very little information is provided to educators about
specific interventions that are recommended for use with children in the “red zone” who display
problem behavior. The website of the United States Department of Education’s Office of Special
Education Programs (OSEP), has a section on the tertiary level of the pyramid that contains only
very general information about the FBA process and development of BIPs.127 Other texts that
address intervention strategies for children in the “red zone” address only mild behavior
exhibited by young children.128 Indeed, the bulk of the research regarding implementation of the
PBS pyramidal framework has focused on the primary tier, with the result that the secondary and
tertiary systems have been demonstrated “solely by very distinct and limited examples.”129 Thus,
it is somewhat difficult to determine how the PBS framework can operate effectively to aid in
126

Id. at 40.
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STRATEGIES 47–48, 122, 133–34 (2011) (examples include a young child who burps the alphabet, a
preschool-aged child who has tantrums, or a kindergarten-aged child who bites other children to gain
access to toys).
129
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CHILDREN 3, 102 (2013); Terrance M. Scott et al., Decision-Making in Secondary and Tertiary
Interventions of School-wide Systems of Positive Behavior Support, 33 EDUC. AND TREATMENT
CHILDREN 4, 528 (2010).
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designing appropriate interventions to address the severe self-injurious or aggressive behavior of
a particular child.
E. Professional Responses to the PBS Movement
The early- to mid-1990s debate about “aversive” versus “positive” interventions was
highly controversial, leading to shouting matches and other similar behavior.130 Some behavior
analysts accused those in favor of aversive, or punishment-based, interventions of committing
torture.131 Proponents of punishment-based interventions argued that several years of research
had demonstrated the effectiveness of aversive or punishment-based interventions to reduce
severe behavior and that it was immoral to forego these effective treatments.132 As various
professional organizations and disability rights groups began to issue position papers on the
topic, the opposing sides became very entrenched.133
130

Preface in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR

PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 56, at 3, 4, xiii (“At conferences and
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note 107, at 385–404.
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resolutions or other position statements on the ethics of using aversive interventions. In 1981, a disabilityrights organization, The Association for Persons with Severe Handicaps (TASH), issued as Resolution on
the Cessation of Intrusive Interventions. Tash Resolution on Positive Behavioral Supports, TASH.ORG
(adopted October 1981) (last revised March 2000) http://tash.org/about/resolutions/tash-resolutionpositive-behavioral-supports/. Thereafter, several professional organizations issued position statements
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Leaving aside the rhetoric, however, the PBS movement is credited with making several
important contributions to the science of behavioral interventions. First, the PBS movement is
credited with emphasizing the “systems perspective on problem behaviors,”134 a perspective that
requires critical analysis of the antecedent environmental conditions that might cause problem
behavior to occur.135 This PBS focus on environmental conditions has led to nearly universal
acceptance of the FBA process and the development of protocols for conducting FBAs.136 The
PBS movement also spurred research into antecedent-based interventions and other “nonpunitive
procedures.”137 The PBS movement led to an “explosion” of research regarding both antecedentbased interventions and reinforcement-based (as opposed to punishment-based) interventions.138
The PBS movement also spurred a critical debate about the interplay between the
effectiveness of interventions and the humane treatment of disabled individuals. Over the years,
this focus on the treatment acceptability of interventions caused several professionals in the field
to reexamine their own views about the circumstances, if any, under which certain behavioral
interventions are appropriate.139 Surveys of professional behavior analysts, whether they are PBS

that took varying positions on the ethics of using aversive interventions. Seiden & Zirkel, supra note 78,
at 1030–31; Singh, supra note 56, apps. A–E.
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in Treatment Acceptability, 10 J. BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 212, 218 (2008) (survey of both ABA and PBS
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proponents or not, indicate that behavior analysts have increased their use of positive-based
interventions and decreased their use of punishment-based interventions from earlier decades.140
And yet there are several criticisms of a PBS, or “positive-only,” approach to behavioral
interventions. First, critics note that some children demonstrate severe behavior at such a high
rate of frequency that it is difficult to find appropriate behaviors that can be “positively”
reinforced, with the result that children cannot be engaged in any meaningful learning until the
interfering behaviors are reduced by punishment.141 Indeed, for individuals whose problem
behavior is a function of automatic reinforcement, such as sensory stimulation, a reinforcementonly intervention may not be effective because the external reinforcer being delivered (a toy or
piece of food) is not “potent” enough to overcome the internal sensory stimulation of the
behavior itself.142
experts indicated that the acceptability of punishment-based interventions declined over time); Craig A.
Michaels, et. al., Personal Paradigm Shifts in PBS Experts: Perception of Treatment Acceptability of
Decelerative Consequence-Based Behavioral Procedures, 7 J. POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 93, 93–
94 (2005) (survey of PBS experts indicated that acceptability of punishment-based interventions declined
between 1970s and 1990s).
140

Brown, supra note 139, at 218 (survey of both ABA and PBS experts); Michaels, supra note 139,

at 93–94 (survey of PBS experts).
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Newsom & Kroeger, supra note 80, at 417 (“[S]everal studies with autistic children show that

learning may be very slow and unstable due to the interference of problem behaviors . . . over a long
period of time. Progress does not improve for some children until interfering behaviors are reduced by
punishment.”).
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Roscoe, supra note 36, at 636 (“One possible explanation for the limited effectiveness of DRO and

DRA procedures with individuals who engage in stereotypic behavior is that stimulation produced by the
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In addition, many behavioral analysts, whether pro-PBS or not, agree that an optimal
intervention plan for many disabled individuals with severe behavior may require a combination
of both reinforcement-based and punishment-based interventions.143 Indeed, there is a wealth of
research that demonstrates that “[t]he combination of reinforcement and punishment is superior
to reinforcement alone.”144 Depending on the particular individual, “reinforcement-based
interventions may be ineffective without the use of extinction or punishment.”145 Thus, effective
treatment for some individuals might require a “multicomponent approach to intervention”146
behavior is continuously available.”); Thompson, supra note 73, at 322 (In a study of three individuals
with self-injurious behavior, “[r]einforcement alone did not result in a decrease” of the behavior).
143

Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 6 (“[F]or many years, it has been considered a best practice to

accompany the use of aversives with a detailed . . . plan that embodies the major features of PBS”);
CRIMMINS, supra note 32, at 11 (“Punishment as [c]orrective [f]eedback [h]as a [p]lace in [p]ositive
[i]nterventions”); Singh, supra note 56, at 4 (“Some form of contingent aversive stimulation, together
with a positive reinforcement program, may be used to control the behavior if it is life-threatening to the
individual.”). Indeed, the Guidelines issued by the Behavior Analyst Certification Board require that,
whenever punishment procedures are deemed necessary, the behavior analyst must “always include[]
reinforcement procedures for alternative behavior[s].” BACB Guidelines, supra note 61.
144

Saul Axelrod, Myths That (Mis)guide Our Profession, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF

NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
supra note 56, at 59, 62–63 (reviewing the literature); Hagopian, supra note 73, at 224–25 (Severe
behavior decreased at greatest frequency when functional communication training, a position
intervention, was paired with punishment procedures.).
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Carr 1999, supra note 99, at 9.
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that would include “non-PBS strategies.”147 A multicomponent intervention plan that applies
both reinforcement-based and punishment-based interventions together can effectively reduce
the frequency of severe behavior and allow individuals whose behavior caused their admission to
highly restrictive residential settings to transition back to their family homes or community
group home living.148
Another criticism of the PBS movement stems from the difficulty of labeling any
particular interventions as “positive” or “aversive.” Indeed, one commentator noted that, as the
PBS movement began to take hold, “[p]rocedures [that were] deemed aversive by some people in
policy-making roles began to include various relatively mild procedures, just as many behavior
analysts had originally feared.”149 The DRA/DRO debate is just one example of the difficulty of
using subjective terms like “positive” to describe a particular form of intervention. The need to
identify certain approaches as “positive” to be “consumer friendly” has been derided by some. 150
Others note that a potentially ominous side effect of over-labeling interventions as prohibited
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Hanley, supra note 147, at 51.
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“aversive” interventions may be the increased use of medication to control problem behavior.151
Finally, some commentators note that structuring the environment of a disabled
individual in a way that eliminates all punishment-based consequences ignores the reality of
life.152 Punishment is a natural consequence of life,153 and a “totally non-aversive approach
would constitute poor preparation for a [disabled individual] transitioning to an ordinary
community residential or work setting.”154 Rather, behavioral interventions based on punishment
can play a vital role in preparing disabled individuals to understand the demands of community
living and be successful in that context.155
F. Current Punishment-Based Interventions
Without doubt, the PBS movement caused behavior analysts to reexamine moral and
ethical issues surrounding the use of punishment-based interventions.156 Some behavior analysts
articulated a need for further research into the proper role of punishment as a means to address
problem behavior.157 Others declared that procedures such as “water squirts, ammonia capsules,
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pinching, and hair pulling, have . . . become unacceptable in virtually all settings.”158 The current
edition of a leading ABA text states that behavioral interventions must be physically safe for the
child and caregivers and “contain no elements that are degrading or disrespectful to
participants.”159
Punishment-based interventions discussed in the current literature do not include the
aversive therapies described in the early literature, with the exception of contingent electric
shock.160 A common punishment-based intervention is a verbal reprimand, made in close
proximity to the student and delivered with eye contact while firmly grasping the student’s
shoulders.161 Another punishment-based intervention is response blocking, when a behavior is
physically interrupted as it begins.162 Response blocking is effective in reducing problem
behaviors such as hand mouthing or eye poking.163 A third punishment-based intervention is
158

Newsom & Kroeger, supra note 80, at 410.
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COOPER, supra note 21, at 350. Treatment must be “(a) designed for therapeutic effectiveness, (b)

delivered in a compassionate and caring manner, (c) assessed formatively to determine effectiveness and
terminated if effectiveness is not demonstrated, and (d) sensitive and responsive to the overall physical,
psychological, and social needs of the person.” Id.
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contingent exercise, where the child who engages in problem behavior might be required to stand
up and sit down ten times.164 A fourth punishment-based intervention is overcorrection, which
requires the child who has exhibited problem behavior to repeatedly practice an appropriate
behavior.165
Other punishment-based interventions use negative punishment techniques, where
reinforcement is discontinued when problem behavior occurs. One such method is “time-out,” in
which a child who has displayed problem behavior loses the ability to earn reinforcement for a
period of time.166 A related method of negative punishment is “response cost,” which is akin to a
fine.167 Response cost provides a definite amount of lost reinforcement as a consequence of
engaging in problem behavior.168
Contingent electric shock is still discussed as a form of punishment, although the ethical
and moral concerns are noted, and electric shock is described as the methodology that the
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Id. at 364–65. There also is an intervention technique known as “extinction” that does not fall

neatly into either the reinforcement or punishment category. Extinction is used to remove any
reinforcement that previously encouraged or maintained problem behavior. Extinction removes any
reinforcement that may have existed in the environment before interventions were implemented. For
example, if behavior served the function of gaining attention, extinction would eliminate all forms of
attention for that behavior. Id. at 457.
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“practitioner turns to when all other methods have failed.”169
Recent studies of ABA and PBS experts demonstrate that, although the two groups do
rank the acceptability of punishment-based interventions differently, the differences are not as
stark as the previously robust debate might have indicated. A survey of PBS experts indicated
that three-quarters of the PBS experts would employ interventions using extinction or mild
reprimand.170 Sixty percent of PBS experts surveyed would recommend an intervention using
response cost.171 Fifteen percent of PBS experts stated that they would recommend
overcorrection as an intervention.172 9.7% of PBS experts indicated that they would, under
appropriate circumstances, recommend the use of contingent electric shock.173
The ABA experts indicated a greater willingness to recommend any of the punishmentbased interventions, although only slightly more than one-quarter of ABA experts indicated that
they would recommend contingent electric shock.174
III. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
A. History
Before 1975, disabled children had no uniform right to attend public school throughout
the United States.175 After the Supreme Court determined in Brown v. Board of Education176 that
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Id. at 353.
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racially segregated education violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,177 advocates for the disabled began to assert that children with disabilities also were
entitled to an equal educational opportunity.178 Yet even following the decision in Brown,
judicial decisions and state statutes specifically allowed public schools to keep disabled children
who were deemed “‘uneducable’”179 from attending public school.180
More than a decade after the Court’s decision in Brown, Congress enacted the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which provided grants to school districts that
voluntarily provided special education services.181 In 1973, Congress enacted Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, a general civil rights statute that prohibited discrimination against the

Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 355–56 (1990).
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347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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that children with disabilities were entitled to equal access to public education. See e.g., Mills v. Bd. of
Ed. of Dist. of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866, 874–75, 878 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass’n. for Retarded Children
v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1972) [hereinafter PARC].
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181
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disabled by any organization or entity that received federal assistance.182 Neither of these laws,
however, required that disabled children receive a public education.183
Federal funding for special education first occurred in 1975, when Congress passed the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA).184 The EAHCA conditioned the states’
receipt of federal funds upon compliance with the statute’s requirement that each child with
disability receive a “free appropriate public education,” or FAPE.185 In 1990, Congress
reauthorized the EAHCA with several substantive amendments, including renaming the statute
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).186 IDEA was again reauthorized and
amended in both 1997 and 2004.187
Because IDEA is a federal funding statute, states that receive IDEA funds are required to
comply with the statutory scheme, including creating policies and procedures that will
implement the requirements of IDEA.188 The states also must monitor schools’ compliance with
the statute.189 IDEA does allow the states to determine certain policies or procedures that are
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necessary to implement IDEA, but except as to those identified matters, the states must conform
to the provisions of IDEA.190 Nothing in the statute allows the states to prohibit the use of
particular behavioral interventions.191
B. Critical Provisions of IDEA
From the time of its initial passage in 1975 through the present, IDEA has contained
certain fundamental principles that govern the provision of special education to disabled
children. The first fundamental principle is that the educational goal is very broad. In
reauthorizing IDEA in 2004, Congress articulated a “national policy of ensuring equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals
with disabilities.”192 The educational goal for children with disabilities stretches far beyond the
“3 R’s” of reading, writing, and “’rithmetic.”193 The goal is to prepare children with disabilities
to live, to the fullest extent possible, well-rounded lives as valued members of their
communities.194
A second governing principle of IDEA is the requirement that each child with a disability
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Examples include such choices as to whether a foster parent may act as a parent for IDEA
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receive a FAPE.195 In its 1983 decision in Board of Education v. Rowley, the Supreme Court
addressed the critical question of how to measure whether a proposed educational program
constituted an “appropriate” education for a particular child.196 In Rowley, the parents of a deaf
child sought to have their public school district provide the child with a sign language interpreter
in all academic classes.197 After the school district refused to do so, the parents initiated
administrative proceedings, and the school district prevailed at both levels of a two-tiered
administrative process.198
The parents then filed suit in federal district court.199 The district court disagreed with the
findings at the administrative level below and concluded that the school district’s proposals did
not provide the child with a FAPE.200 In so holding, the court defined an “appropriate education”
as one that provided the disabled child with an “opportunity to achieve his [or her] full potential

195
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(2012).
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commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.”201 After the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed.202
The Court first determined that the FAPE requirement had both a substantive and a
procedural aspect.203 As to the substantive aspect, the Court rejected the district court’s standard
for measuring an appropriate education.204 Deeming the district court’s holding as a requirement
that the educational program “maximize the potential”205 of a disabled child, the Court instead
chose a far lower threshold.206 Defining its standard as a “basic floor of opportunity,”207 the
Court held that an appropriate education is one that is “individually designed to provide
201

Id. at 534. The district court in Rowley articulated a number of potential definitions of an

appropriate education. Id. The court noted that an appropriate education “could mean an ‘adequate’
education” that would do no more than allow a child to progress from grade to grade and meet the
minimum requirements to earn a high school diploma. Id. The court also stated that an appropriate
education “could also mean one which enables the handicapped child to achieve his or her full potential.”
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educational benefit to the handicapped child.”208 The Court then concluded that the services
provided by the school district were sufficient to confer “educational benefit” on the child and,
thus, the district had provided a FAPE.209 The Court also determined that the procedural aspect
of the FAPE requirement is satisfied when the child and his or her parents are afforded all of
IDEA’s procedural requirements for notice and parental participation in the process of
developing the child’s educational plan.210
A third governing principle of special education is that each disabled child has an
individualized educational program (IEP).211 The IEP is a written document that sets forth the
“specially designed instruction”212 that will meet that particular child’s unique needs. IDEA
208

Id.
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Id. at 201, 210. The Court recognized that the phrase “educational benefit” was a flexible concept

that would depend in large part on the nature and severity of each child’s disability. Id. at 202. Indeed, the
Court explicitly declined to establish a single test by which the adequacy of an educational benefit would
be measured. Id. Although the Court explicitly confined its analysis to the facts of the particular case
before it, the decision has been universally interpreted as creating a standard to be applied in all cases. See
Amy J. Goetz et al., The Devolution of the Rowley Standard in the Eighth Circuit: Protecting the Right to
a Free and Appropriate Public Education by Advocating for Standards-Based IEPs, 34 HAMLINE L. REV.
503, 504 n.5 (2011) (“It is clear from the decision itself that the Rowley Court intended only to articulate a
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disclaimer, the Rowley Court’s analysis has been uniformly cited by courts throughout the nation as a
standard for determining whether a FAPE has been provided.”).
210

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209.

211

Id. at 181–82.

212

The federal regulations define “specially designed instruction” as “adapting, as appropriate to the

41

contains very detailed provisions about the composition of a child’s IEP team, the contents of the
IEP, the process by which an IEP is developed, and the parties’ rights to seek administrative and
judicial review in the event of a disagreement.213 The IEP document has been described as the
“cornerstone” of the disabled child’s right to an education.214
As a corollary to the right to an IEP designed to meet the child’s unique needs, the child
is entitled to receive educational services in the least restrictive environment215 that will allow
the child to learn. Special education does not occur only in a public school building; if a child’s
unique needs require that the child be placed in either a private day school or a residential

needs of an eligible child . . . the content, methodology, or delivery of instruction.” 34 C.F.R.
§300.39(b)(3) (2012).
213

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)-(4) (2012). The IEP must contain the following information: (a) the child’s

present levels of performance; (b) a description of annual goals and objectives for the child’s educational
performance; (c) a means to “measure” whether the child has attained the prescribed goals and objectives;
(d) the methods by which educators will report on the child’s progress towards meeting goals and
objectives; (e) a statement of the specific special educations services and supplementary aids and supports
that the child will receive; and (f) a statement as to the extent to which the child will not participate with
typically developing peers in the general education classroom or activities, among other information. Id. §
1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–VI) (2012).
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facility, such a placement must be made at public expense.216 When a child is placed in a private
school by a public agency, that school must conform to all of the requirements of IDEA.217
Finally, when it passed the EAHCA in 1975, Congress also recognized that children with
disabilities and their parents needed robust due process protections to ensure that schools would
fully implement the statute’s requirements.218 Prior to 1975, when a school district excluded a
child from public school on grounds that the child was “uneducable,” parents had no notice or
opportunity to challenge the school district’s decision to exclude the child from school.219
Congress remedied that circumstance by giving parents several vitally important due process
rights.220 These “procedural protections created powerful tools for parents as they advocated for
216
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access to public education for their children with disabilities.”221 Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Rowley recognized that these “elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards” reflect the
great importance that Congress placed on parental participation in all aspects of the child’s
educational planning and progress.222 The extensive and detailed procedural protections afforded
to disabled children, and their parents acting as advocates for their children, are another
fundamental principle of special education.
C. The 1997 and 2004 Amendments to IDEA
Before 1997, IDEA lacked any provisions regarding behavioral interventions to address
problem behavior that might impede a disabled child’s ability to learn. Beginning as early as
1987, however, the federal government began to appropriate funds to research “non-aversive” or
“positive” approaches to manage behavior of children and adults with disabilities. In 1987, the
National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research (NIDRR) awarded a grant of several
hundred thousand dollars to university researchers to study “‘Nonaversive Behavior
Management.’”223 In 1990, Congress amended the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act to provide funds for research about “positive behavior management programs”
that might improve the lives of individuals with disabilities.224 When Congress again amended
the same Act in 1994, Congress authorized the Department of Education to award grants for
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research into the use of “positive behavioral supports” to support individuals with disabilities.225
Similarly, in 1991, the Department of Education issued several funding priorities,
pursuant to its authority under Section 204 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, for research that
would “lead to the development of methods, procedures, and devices that will benefit individuals
with disabilities, especially those with the most severe disabilities.”226 From 1991 to 1997, the
Department of Education repeatedly articulated one of its funding priorities to be research into
the use of “positive intervention strategies” to address “excess behaviors” in disabled
individuals.227 Indeed, in 1996, OSEP established a “Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions
and Supports.”228
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When Congress amended IDEA in 1997, it added language about the use of behavioral
interventions to treat problematic behavior. The 1997 amendments amended 20 U.S.C. Section
1414(d)(3)(B)(i) to require that a child’s IEP team consider a variety of “special factors” that
might adversely affect the child’s educational performance.229 One of those special factors was
the circumstance where a child’s behavior might impede the child’s learning.230 The statute
provided that the IEP team should consider “strategies, including positive behavioral
interventions, strategies, and supports to address” problematic behavior.231
Congress’s intent in inserting this language into IDEA cannot be determined. The
legislative history, including the House and Senate reports, does not reveal any discussion by
Congress about the reasons why this language was inserted into the statute.232 The House and
the Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports as “giv[ing] schools capacity-building
information and technical assistance for identifying, adapting, and sustaining effective school-wide
disciplinary practices.” Supporting District Structures & Teams through a State-Level Plan Power Point
found at http://www.pbis.org/presentations/chicago-forum-09 (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). According to
the Department of Education, “the Center has two foci: (1) Broad dissemination to schools, families, and
communities [that the] technology of school-wide positive behavioral interventions and support exists;
and (2) Demonstrations at the level of individual students, schools, districts, and states that school-wide
positive behavioral interventions and support are feasible and effective.” U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Other
Sites: Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, ED.gov,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/contacts/gen/othersites/specedrs.html. (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
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Senate reports also are silent on the topic. The term “positive behavioral interventions” is not
defined in the statute, the implementing regulations, or the comments that accompany the
implementing regulations.233
The ability of school officials to discipline children with disabilities was a hot-button
issue at the time, and the 1997 amendments did add procedures to address the discipline issue.234
Indeed, the provisions regarding discipline provide the most detailed references to behavioral
intervention techniques. Under the 1997 amendments, school officials were required to
determine whether the behavior leading to disciplinary measures previously had been the subject
of an FBA or a BIP.235 If not, the child’s IEP team was to convene and consider whether an FBA
should be conducted and a BIP implemented.236 While the statutory provisions regarding
discipline do not use the term “positive behavioral interventions or supports,” they are the only
provisions in IDEA that refer to FBAs and BIPs.
Congress again reauthorized and amended IDEA in 2004.237 At that time, Congress

available at 1997 WL 258948 (providing no discussion of the language); Turnbull supra note 37, at 449–
50 (discussing lack of insight into Congress’s motives in including the language).
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amended the language of Section 1414(d)(B)(3)(i) slightly. The statute now provides that “in the
case of a child whose behavior impedes” learning, the child’s IEP team shall “consider the use of
positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior.”238
Congress also amended the provisions relating to discipline of a disabled child, but without
altering the requirements that, in certain circumstances, an FBA be conducted and a BIP be
implemented.239
As was true in 1997, the legislative history of the 2004 amendments do not demonstrate
that Congress intended to limit behavioral interventions to “positive” interventions or otherwise
ban the use of non-positive interventions. The Senate’s Committee on Health, Education, Labor
and Pension did hear testimony about the use of behavioral supports in school in a hearing
entitled “IDEA: Behavioral Supports in School.”240 The main focus of the hearing, however, was
the issue of whether IDEA’s current disciplinary process “force[d] schools to keep disruptive,

Although IDEA has not undergone any substantive revisions since 2004, the statutory provisions were
amended slightly in 2010 as part of an effort by Congress to substitute the terms “intellectual disability”
and “individual with an intellectual disability” for terms “mental retardation” or “mentally retarded
individual,” respectively, wherever those terms appeared in any federal statute. See Pub. L. No. 111-256,
124 Stat. 2643 (2010).
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to IDEA identify research conducted by OSEP as demonstrating that the use of positive behavioral
interventions can reduce the incidence of significant behavioral problems See S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 22,
(2003) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108srpt185/pdf/CRPT-108srpt185.pdf.
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aggressive, and violent children in regular classrooms.”241 One of the witnesses was Dr. George
Sugai; at the time of the hearing, Dr. Sugai was a member of the faculty at the University of
Oregon and a Co-Director of the National Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions and
Supports, the OSEP-funded PBIS Center.242 Dr. Sugai’s testimony focused on “schoolwide
positive behavioral supports”243 and did not provide any detail about the means by which
positive-only behavioral interventions might be implemented in a BIP to address a particular
child’s behavior.244
The Senate Report that accompanied the Senate bill does state the opinion of the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions that, “in most cases,” positive behavior
supports and interventions can reduce problematic behavior.245 That statement, however, is not
241
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accompanied by any further details that would illuminate the Committee’s opinion. In addition,
the House Conference Report released just before Congress voted on the 2004 amendments does
not contain any discussion of the relative merits of positive behavioral interventions or any
proposed ban on the use of aversive interventions.246
The 2004 Amendments did add certain references to positive behavioral interventions
and supports in other sections of IDEA. In the “Findings and Purposes” section of the statute,
108srpt185/pdf/CRPT-108srpt185.pdf. The 2004 amendments to IDEA began as House Bill 1350. The
Senate bill was Senate Bill 1248. Both bills contained the identical language about the use of “positive
behavioral interventions or other strategies” to address problematic behavior. The House Report that
accompanied House Bill 1350 had no specific comments on the language. The Senate Report that
accompanied Senate Bill 1248 stated:
The committee has heard a great deal from professionals about the behavior of students
with disabilities, the danger posed by some behavior, and the effect that behavior has on
the learning environment. The committee believes that, in most cases, the behavior of
students can be addressed and prevented effectively through positive behavioral
interventions and supports. Therefore, section 614(d)(3)(B)(i) requires IEP teams to
provide positive behavioral interventions and supports for children with disabilities
whose behavior impedes their learning or the learning of others. The committee believes
that taking this proactive approach should result in reductions in behavior problems and
disciplinary referrals, as well as improved educational results for students with
disabilities.

S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 32.
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Congress stated that research demonstrated the education of children with disabilities “can be
made more effective by,” among other things, providing positive behavioral interventions and
supports.247 Congress also authorized funding to train school personnel in the use of positive
behavioral supports and interventions.248
D. Federal Legislative Proposals to Define and Regulate Aversive Behavioral Interventions
In recent years, several bills have been introduced in Congress that would address the use
of aversive behavioral interventions in an educational setting. In December 2009, a bill was
introduced both in the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, that proposed
federal legislation to regulate the use of seclusion and restraint in schools.249 The Senate and
House bills both would prohibit the use of “aversive behavioral interventions that [would]
compromise [the] health and safety”250 of students, although such aversive behavioral
interventions are not defined. Rather, each bill proposed to have the Secretary of Education
promulgate regulations that would set standards for the use of, among other items, “aversive
behavioral interventions.”251 The House bill was passed in the House of Representatives and was
sent to the Senate, where both bills then were referred to the Senate’s Committee on Health,
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20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(F) (2012).
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See, e.g., id. §§ 1462(a)(6), 1465(b)(1)(B).
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Keeping All Student Safe Act, H.R. 4247, 111th Cong. (2009), available at

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4247rfs/pdf/BILLS-111hr4247rfs.pdf; Preventing Harmful
Restraint and Seclusion in Schools Act, S. 2860, 111th Cong (2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s2860is/pdf/BILLS-111s2860is.pdf.
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H.R. 4247 §3(3)(B); S. 2680 §(3)(3)(B).
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H.R. 4247 §5(a)(1)(D); S. 2680 §5(a)(1)(D).
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Education, Labor and Pensions.252
In both 2012 and 2013, the House bill was re-introduced in the House.253 In July 2013,
the bill was referred to the House’s Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary and
Secondary Education.254
IV. STATE REGULATIONS ON THE USE OF AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS
In the years since IDEA first included the term “positive behavioral interventions and
supports,” some states have taken action either at the legislative or regulatory level to address the
use of aversive interventions in an educational setting. Currently twelve states and the District of
Columbia have statutes or regulations that address the use of aversive interventions, procedures,
or techniques at school.255 These statutes and regulations vary widely both in defining aversive
252

Bill Summary & Status of H.R. 4247, 111th Cong. Major Congressional Actions (2009–2010),THE

LIBRARY OF CONG. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04247:@@@R (last visited Aug.
31, 2014).
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Keeping All Students Safe Act, H.R. 1381, 112th Cong. (2011); Keeping All Students Safe Act,

H.R. 1893, 113th Cong. (2013) (bill summary and status available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d113:h.r.01893).
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H.R. 1893 (bill summary and status available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-

bin/query/z?c113:H.R.1893).
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CAL EDUC. CODE. §§ 56520, 56521.2 (2013); D.C. CODE §§ 38-2561.01, 38-2561.03 (West

WestlawNext current through Feb. 21, 2014); 704 Ky. Admin. Regs. §7:160 (2013),
http://www.lrc.ky.gov/kar/704/007/160.htm; 05-071 Code Me. R. §§ 2(1), 6(2)(F) (2013),
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/rules/05/chaps05.htm; Mont. Admin. R. 10.16.3346 (2013),
http://www.mtrules.org/gateway/Print_RV.Asp?RV=30430; N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs tit. 8,.§§
19.5(b), 200.22(e) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 388.521–388.5317, 449.765–449.786, 394.353–

52

interventions and regulating their use.256

394.379 (2013) (public instruction; hospitals and mental health facilities; and private educational
institutions, respectively); N.H. Code R. Ed. 1113.04–1113.15, 1114.07–1114.22 (2013) (district-run
programs and non-public programs, respectively); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-391.1 (2011); Ohio
Admin. Code 3301-35-15 (2013), http://codes.ohio.gov/oac/3301-35-15; 22 Pa. Code §§ 14.133, 711.46
(2008) (applicable to special education services and programs generally and to charter schools and
cyberschools); Wash. Admin. Code. § 392-172A-03120(1)–(2) (2013),
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=392-172A-03120; 5-42 Wyo. Code R. § 6 (LexisNexis
2013). Conn. Agencies Regs. §17a-227-1(c).
256

Two states, Delaware and Connecticut, have regulations that ban the use of “aversive techniques”

in nonpublic schools, but the term “aversive techniques” is not defined anywhere in the regulations. See
16-Del. Admin. Code. 3320-20.11.13 (2014); Conn. Agencies Regs. § 17a-238-10 (2014) (prohibiting the
use of aversive techniques in “residential schools”); Conn. Agencies Regs. § 17a-227-1(aa) (2014)
(defining residential schools). Although the term “aversive techniques” is not defined, the Connecticut
regulations define an “aversive procedure” as “the planned use of an event which may be unpleasant,
noxious, or otherwise cause discomfort, to alter the occurrence of a specific behavior or to protect an
individual from injuring himself or others.” Conn. Agencies Regs. §17a-227-1(c). This defined term is
not applied anywhere in the regulations.
Rhode Island’s regulations also contain a definition of “aversive interventions/strategies” in
regulations governing the use of seclusion and restraint, but the definition is not applied in any other
regulation. 21-2 R.I. Code R. §§ 39:3.2, 39:3.20 (LexisNexis 2013) (including the definitions section and
noting that the provisions governing physical restraint do not apply the definition of aversive
interventions or strategies).
Several states have provisions that govern the use of seclusion (sometimes called time-out) and
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Pennsylvania’s regulations, entitled “Positive Behavioral Support,” state that positive, not
negative, measures should form the basis for behavioral support programs for disabled
children.257 The regulations also define “aversive techniques” as “deliberate activities designed
to establish a negative association with a specific behavior.”258 The Pennsylvania regulations
provide examples of prohibited aversive techniques, including corporal punishment; locked
rooms or spaces; noxious substances; “deprivation of basic human rights, such as withholding
meals [or] water”; “treatment of a demeaning nature”; and “electric shock.”259
The regulations specify that, when a disabled child’s behavior impedes learning, the
child’s IEP team is required to develop a “positive behavioral support plan,” which must include
“methods that utilize positive reinforcement and other positive techniques to shape a student’s or
eligible young child’s behavior, ranging from the use of positive verbal statements as a reward
for good behavior to specific tangible rewards.”260 Notwithstanding this emphasis on positive
reinforcement, Pennsylvania does allow the use of restraint, as that term is defined, to be
included in a child’s IEP as an approved behavioral intervention under certain circumstances.261

restraint in school, but those provisions do not discuss “aversive” interventions, procedures or techniques.
For a comprehensive survey of state regulations regarding the use of seclusion and restraint, see Daniel
Stewart, How Do the States Regulate Restraint and Seclusion in Public School? A Survey of the Strength
and Weaknesses in State Laws, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 531 (2011).
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22 Pa. Code §14.133 (2008).
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Id. §§ 14.133(b), 711.46(b).
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Id. §§ 14.133(e), 711.46(e).
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Id. §§ 14.133(b), 711.46(b).
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Id. §§ 14.133(c)(2), 711.46(c)(2).
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Wyoming defines “aversives” as interventions that are “intended to induce pain or
discomfort to a student for the purpose of eliminating or reducing maladaptive behaviors.”262 The
Wyoming regulations do not provide any examples of aversive interventions, which are
“prohibited practices” that may not be utilized under any circumstances.263 Behavioral
interventions may include “positive strategies, program or curricular modifications, and aids and
supports required to address the disruptive behaviors.”264 Wyoming does, however, permit the
use of certain forms of restraint and seclusion as part of a “planned behavioral intervention”
without articulating the standards under which restraint or seclusion would be included in a
BIP.265
Ohio also defines aversive interventions as interventions that “induce pain or discomfort
to a student for the purpose of eliminating or reducing maladaptive behaviors.”266 The Ohio
regulations further provide that such interventions include “noxious, painful and/or intrusive
stimuli, including any form of noxious, painful or intrusive spray, inhalant or taste.”267 Ohio
defines “[p]ositive behavior intervention and supports” as both “systemic and individualized
positive strategies to reinforce desired behaviors, diminish reoccurrences of challenging
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5-42 Wyo. Code R. § 6(j)(i) (2013).

263

Id. § 6(j).
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Id. § 6(d).
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Id. § 7(b). The Wyoming regulations prohibit the use of mechanical restraint or prone restraint

under any circumstances. Id. § 6(j). The regulations also distinguish between different forms of seclusion
and prohibit under any circumstances the use of “locked seclusion.” Id. § 6(n).
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Ohio Admin. Code 3301-35-15(A)(1) (2013).

267

Id.
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behaviors, and teach appropriate behaviors to students.”268
Kentucky and Maine both prohibit the use of “[a]versive behavioral interventions” on any
child “at any time.”269 These two states define an aversive behavioral intervention similarly. For
example, Kentucky defines the intervention as one that “the implementer knows would cause
physical trauma, emotional trauma, or both, to a student even when the substance or stimulus
appears to be pleasant or neutral to others.”270 The Kentucky regulations provide specific
examples of aversive interventions, including “hitting, pinching, slapping, water spray, noxious
fumes, extreme physical exercise, loud auditory stimuli, withholding of meals, or denial of
reasonable access to toileting facilities.”271
The District of Columbia defines aversive interventions as “specific strategies for
behavioral-treatment intervention” that include noxious, painful, intrusive stimuli, sprays, or
inhalants; electric shock; pinches and deep muscle squeezes; withholding adequate sleep, shelter,
clothing, bedding, or bathroom facilities; withholding food or water or intentionally altering
staple food or drink to make it distasteful; or the use of chemical restraint.272 However, the
District of Columbia’s prohibition on the use of aversive intervention applies only to children
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Id. at 3301-35-15(A)(7).
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704 Ky. Admin Regs.7:160(3)(2)(c) (2013); 05-071 Code Me. R. §§ 2(1), 6(2)(F) (2001) (defining

“aversive procedure” and prohibiting its use “under any circumstances” respectively).
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704 Ky. Admin Regs. 7:160(1); 05-071 Code Me. R. § 2(1) (providing a similar definition of an

“aversive procedure”).
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704 Ky. Admin. Regs. 7:160(1).
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D.C. CODE § 38-2561.01(1) (West, WestlawNext current through Feb. 21, 2014).
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who are enrolled in nonpublic schools at public expense.273
Montana defines “aversive treatment procedures” as physical restraint and isolation timeout, two terms which are defined in the regulations.274 Those two aversive treatment procedures
may be included as planned interventions in a child’s IEP only after a documented failure of
positive behavioral interventions to effectively address the behavior.275 Montana prohibits other
practices, such as procedures “intended to cause physical pain”; the use of “aversive mists,
noxious odors, [or] unpleasant tastes”; and mechanical restraint, among others, but does not label
those procedures as either “aversive” or “interventions.”276
Nevada, California, Washington, and New Hampshire define aversive behavioral
interventions277 to include, with some variations in language, the following: (a) noxious odors or
tastes (or taste treatment programs); (b) noxious, toxic or unpleasant mists, sprays, or substances;
(c) unreasonable force, restraint, or corporal punishment; (d) electric shock; or (e) isolation or
removal to a locked room.278 A subset of these states also prohibit the following: (a) verbal and
mental abuse, humiliation, or ridicule; (b) forced exercise; (c) blasts of air or painful noises or
sounds; (d) withholding food, liquid, adequate sleep, shelter, clothing, bedding, or access to
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D.C. CODE § 38-2561.03.
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Mont. Admin. R. 10.16.3346(2) (2013).
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Id. 10.16.3346(7).
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Id. 10.16.3346(4).
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While substantively prohibiting certain behavioral interventions, California’s code does not use the

term “aversive behavior interventions.” See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56521.2 (2013).
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CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56521.2(A); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 388.5215, 394.354, 449.766 (2013);

N.H. Code R. Ed. 1113.04(c), 1114.07(G) (2013); Wash. Admin. Code § 392-172A-03125 (2013).
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bathroom facilities; (e) chemical restraint; (f) deprivation of one or more of the child’s senses;
(g) water treatment; or (h) deprivation of medication.279
California and Nevada prohibit the use of these aversive behavioral interventions,
although restraint may be used in emergency circumstances.280 In Nevada, the use of restraint on
a child may require the child’s IEP team to consider whether to conduct an FBA and implement
a “positive behavior plan” and “positive behavioral supports.”281 Those two terms are not
defined, but the Nevada Administrative Code does define “[p]ositive behavioral supports” as “a
process for integrating behavior analysis . . . which focus[es] on promoting positive changes in
behavior and enhancing the overall quality of life for pupils . . . without the use of negative or
aversive means.”282
Washington and New Hampshire allow certain forms of physical contact or restraint to be
approved aversive interventions that are written into a child’s IEP (presumably as part of a BIP)
but only after certain conditions have been met.283 These conditions include documenting the
failure of positive behavioral interventions and specifying the type of aversive interventions to be
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CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56521.2(a); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 388.5215, 394.534, 449.766; N.H.

Code R. Ed. 1113.04(c), 1114.07(g); Wash. Admin. Code §392-172A-03125.
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CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56521.1; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.5275.
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NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 388.5275, 388.528.
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Nev. Admin. Code § 388.077 (2013).
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Washington allows the use of “bodily contact,” “isolation,” and “physical restraint” as part of a

child’s BIP. Wash. Admin. Code §§ 392-172A-03130, 392-172A-03135. New Hampshire allows “nonmedical mechanical restraint” and “[p]hysical restraint” to be included in a child’s IEP. N.H. Code R. Ed.
§§ 1113.06, 1114.09.

58

used; the reasons why aversive interventions are determined to be appropriate; the
“circumstances under which the aversive interventions may be used”; the training and
qualifications of the individual who will administer the aversive interventions; a means to
evaluate the “effects of the use of the aversive interventions”; a time limit for the use of the
intervention[s]; a system to record the “frequency, duration, and results of the intervention[s]”;
and giving notice to the child’s parents.284 These states also require that positive behavioral
interventions be implemented before any aversive interventions.285
A. The New York Regulations
1. The Impetus for the Regulations
Through 2005, New York had no regulations that addressed the use of aversive
interventions in an educational setting. In July 2006, the New York State Education Department
(NYSED) issued a notice indicating that NYSED had adopted “emergency” regulations that
banned the use of aversive interventions.286 The same notice also provided notice to the public
that NYSED was seeking comments on proposed non-emergency rule-making that would ban the
inclusion of aversive interventions in a child’s IEP.287 Following a notice and comment period, in
November 2006, NYSED issued revised regulations that became final.288
284

N.H. Code R. Ed §§ 1113.06, 1114.09; Wash Admin. Code § 392-172A-03135.
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See Notice of Proposed Emergency Adoption and Proposed Rule-Making, XXVIII N.Y. Reg. 10,

11 (July 12, 2006) (noting that the proposed rule was meant to develop certain behavior intervention
standards).
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Id. at 11.
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N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 19.5(b).
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NYSED was prompted to consider regulations that would ban the use of aversive
interventions after, among other things, an April and May 2006 site visit to the Judge Rotenberg
Center in Canton, Massachusetts (the “JRC”).289 The JRC is a residential facility for children and
adults with severe behavioral issues.290 It has a very controversial past and has been the subject
of intense criticism for its practices.291 The JRC is known for using aversive interventions
289

See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit at 1–2, Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 2013 WL 1329632 (Mar. 29, 2013).
290

Id. at 4.
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For decades, the JRC has been intensely criticized for its methods. See e.g., Sharon Freagon, One

Educator’s Perspective on the Use of Punishment or Aversives: Advocating for Supportive and Protective
Systems, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF NONAVERSIVE AND AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR PERSONS
WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,

supra note 56, at 146, 136–150. In 1985, the JRC, then known as

the Behavior Research Institute (BRI) was located in Providence, Rhode Island, although students from
other states, including Massachusetts, were enrolled at the facility. In 1985, a student who was a
Massachusetts resident died of asphyxiation at the BRI facility, apparently while being restrained. Id. at
149. As a result of that incident, the State of Massachusetts sued the BRI in order to have certain practices
or methods discontinued. In 1986, the BRI and the State of Massachusetts reached a settlement that
required the facility to obtain court approval before using aversive interventions with any student. See
Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Dep’t. of Mental Retardation, 677 NE.2d 127, 132 n.5
(Mass. 1997) (reciting history leading to settlement).
Over the years, there have been several reports of abuse at the JRC, including video taken in 2002 of
one student being restrained and shocked and another incident in 2007 when students received dozens of
shock treatments by staff. See Judge Rotenberg Center Trial: Tape Shows Teen Being Shocked 31 Times,
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/12/judge-rotenberg-center-
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trial_n_1420633.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) (noting that the JRC’s attorney stated that the treatment
plan was followed); Bianca Vázquez Toness, Founder Forced To Leave Controversial Special Needs
School, 90.9 WBUR NPR BOSTON, http://www.wbur.org/2011/05/26/rotenberg (last visited Aug. 31, 2014)
(referencing the 2007 incident in the discussion of the resignation of Matthew Israel, the founder of the
JRC). In 2011, as part of a deal with prosecutors to avoid prosecution stemming from the 2007 incident,
the Executive Director of the JRC, Matthew Israel, resigned from his position. School Head Quits After
Shock Snafu, THE BERKSHIRE EAGLE http://www.berkshireeagle.com/northeastnews/ci_18141525
(updated May 26, 2011, 11:24 PM) (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). Even after this resignation, reports
continue to surface about abusive practices at the JRC. See, e.g., Chris Burrell, Report Criticizes Canton
School that uses Shock Therapy, PATRIOT LEDGER, http://www.patriotledger.com/x1506808054/Reportcriticizes-Canton-school-that-uses-shock-therapy (updated May 7, 2013, 7:12 AM) (last visited Aug. 31,
2014).
In 2010, a disability rights organization submitted a report to the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on Torture urging that the Special Rapporteur initiate an inquiry to address whether practices at the JRC
violated the United Nations Convention against Torture. See Laurie Ahern & Eric Rosenthal, Torture not
Treatment: Electric Shock and Long-Term Restraint in the United States on Children and Adults with
Disabilities at the Judge Rotenberg Center (2010) (available at www.mdri.org). In response, Special
Rapporteur Manfred Nowak stated that he had sent an appeal to the United States government to
investigate the school. See Katie Hinman & Kimberly Brown, UN Calls Shock Treatment At Mass. School
“Torture” ABCNEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/shock-therapy-massachussettsschool/story?id=11047334 (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). U.N. Special Rapporteur Juan Mendez also stated
that the use of shock treatment can constitute “torture.” See Mike Beaudet & Kevin Rothstein, U.N.
Investigating Judge Rotenberg Center’s use of Shocks, FOX BOSTON,
http://www.myfoxboston.com/story/18840703/2012/06/20/un-investigating-judge-rotenberg-centers-useof-shocks (“‘The passage of electricity through anybody’s body is clearly associated with pain and
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including, particularly, contingent electric shock.292
Although the JRC is located in Massachusetts, in 2006 there were just over 150 New
York students293 who were enrolled at the JRC. Some of those students had been placed there by
New York school districts under the provisions of IDEA.294 Because some students were placed

suffering. Now it depends on the level and time and whether there’s any rationale for it.’”) (updated July
4, 2012, 8:16 PM) (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
In February 2013, the Autistic Self Advocacy Network sent a letter to the Food and Drug
Administration urging that the government revoke the “cleared” status for the device through which
electric shock is delivered to students. See Letter to the Food and Drug Administration on the Judge
Rotenberg Center, AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY NETWORK, (Feb. 12, 2013)
http://autisticadvocacy.org/2013/02/letter-to-food-and-drug-administration-on-the-judge-rotenberg-center
(arguing for the elimination of “contingent electric shock and other aversive interventions”).ASAN also
urged the government to deny the JRC any clearance to use any further devices that would allow the
facility to deliver shock treatment to students. Id.
292

The JRC has FDA clearance to use a device known as a “Graduated Electronic Decelerator

device” to deliver electronic shock. Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, No. 8:10-cv-036, 2010 WL
3418424 at *1 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug, 10, 2010).
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See Memorandum from Rebecca H. Cort to the Members of the Board of Regents, EMSC-VESID

Committee, Policy on the Use of Aversive or Noxious Stimuli in Public and Private Schools Serving
Student with Disabilities, (March 20, 2006) available at http://www.regents.nysed.gov/meetings/
2006Meetings/March2006/0306emscvesidd6.htm. [hereinafter Cort memorandum] (discussing the
numbers of New York State students approved for electric shock treatment).
294

See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10(B) (2006) (provisions governing children who are “placed in, or

referred to, private schools by public agencies”).
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at the JRC by their local New York school districts, the JRC was subject to periodic reviews by
NYSED officials.295
In September 2005, NYSED officials visited the JRC to conduct a regular review, and in
January 2006, the JRC received confirmation from NYSED that the facility was in compliance
with New York regulations.296 Just two months later, however, both the JRC and the State of
New York were sued by a former JRC student who alleged that the use of contingent electric
shock by the staff at JRC violated the student’s civil rights.297 The student alleged that NYSED
had “negligently failed to investigate” the practices of the JRC and had negligently failed to

295

Bryant, 2010 WL 3418424 at *2.
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See Letter from Jerri Forshaw, Reg’l Assoc., N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, to Matthew Israel, Exec.

Dir., Judge Rotenberg Center, (Jan. 11, 2006) available at
http://www.judgerotenbergeducationalcenter.net/NYSEDNov05report.pdf. (providing documentation and
notification of compliance); Letter from Jerri Forshaw, Reg’l Assoc., N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, to Matthew
Israel, Exec. Dir., Judge Rotenberg Ctr. (Nov. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.judgerotenbergeducationalcenter.net/NYSEDNov05report.pdf. (providing notification of the
final report of the September 2005 visit).
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See Exhibit A, Nicholson Verified Pet., at 1, 6, to Aff. of Rebecca Cort Filed in Opposition to Pl.

Mot. for T.R.O. and Prelim. Inj., Alleyne v. NY St. Educ. Dept., Civil Action No. 06-cv-00994-GLS
(N.D.N.Y., filed August 21, 2006) (arguing that the JRC’s failure to properly perform its duties under the

law and its use of aversives threatened the student’s life); Exhibit B, Nicholson Claim, at 1–3, to Aff. of
Rebecca Cort Filed in Opposition to Pl. Mot. for T.R.O. and Prelim. Inj., Alleyne v. NY St. Educ. Dept.,
Civil Action No. 06-cv-00994-GLS (N.D.N.Y., filed August 21, 2006) (making a claim against New York
State and the New York State Department of Education for monetary damages).
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enforce certain New York laws regarding the use of corporal punishment.298
The filing of the lawsuit and apparent “questions from legislators, the Board of Regents[,]
and others”299 prompted NYSED to take action. On March 20, 2006, Rebecca Cort of NYSED
forwarded a memorandum to the New York Board of Regents raising the issue whether the
Regents “[s]hould . . . adopt a new policy that prohibits or limits the use of certain behavioral
approaches, including the use of certain aversive or noxious stimuli to reduce or eliminate
maladaptive behaviors of students.”300
In April, NYSED began an in-depth review of practices at the JRC.301 On June 12, 2006,
the team conducting the review issued a report sharply criticizing the JRC.302 Among other
findings, the report stated that staff at the JRC employed aversive behavioral interventions on
students who had no “clear history of self-injurious behaviors” or who had not demonstrated
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See Nicholson v. State, 23 Misc.3d 313 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. (2008)) (granting defendants’ motions for

summary judgment).
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See Exhibit F to Aff. of Rebecca Cort Filed in Opposition to Pl. Mot. for T.R.O. and Prelim. Inj.,

at 1 Alleyne v. NY St. Educ. Dept., Civil Action No. 06-cv-00994-GLS (N.D.N.Y., filed August 21, 2006)
[hereinafter Cort Exhibit F] (reporting on the findings of the April and May visits of NYSED).
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See Cort Memorandum, supra note 293 (recommending that the Board of Regents discuss making

a new policy and pursuing “legislative and/or regulatory action”).
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See Aff. of Rebecca Cort filed in Opposition to Pl. Mot. for T.R.O. and Prelim. Inj., at ¶10 Alleyne

v. NY St. Educ. Dept., Civil Action No. 06-cv-00994-GLS (N.D.N.Y., filed August 21, 2006) (noting that
the review consisted of interviewing staff and students, and reviewing records).
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Cort Exhibit F, supra n. 299 at 2–3.
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aggressive or destructive behaviors warranting the application of an aversive intervention. 303 The
report also found that there was “limited evidence” either that students had received FBAs as
might be required by the IDEA or that JRC staff had collected the data necessary to prepare
FBAs.304 The report also criticized the JRC educational programming as a “punishment model”
that was “organized around the elimination of problem behaviors largely through punishment,
including the use of delayed punishment practices.”305 As a result, the report found, “[t]he
privacy and dignity of students [wa]s compromised in the course of JRC’s program
implementation.”306
Several days after the publication of the report criticizing the JRC, NYSED published its
Notice of Emergency Rule-Making in which it adopted the regulations on an emergency basis
while simultaneously providing the public with an opportunity for notice and comment.307 After
receiving comments and holding public hearings, NYSED issued the final regulations in
November 2006.308
2. The Content of the Regulations
The regulations generally define an aversive intervention as one “that is intended to
induce pain or discomfort to a student for the purpose of eliminating or reducing maladaptive
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behaviors.”309 The regulations further identify specific forms of prohibited aversive
interventions, including the application of “noxious, painful, intrusive stimuli or activities;
strangling, shoving, deep muscle squeezes”; “any form of noxious, painful or intrusive spray,
inhalant or tastes”; the denial or delay in providing a meal or “intentionally altering staple food
or drink in order to make it distasteful”; “movement limitation used as a punishment, including
but not limited to helmets and mechanical restraint devices”; and other similar actions.310
The New York regulations also identify certain interventions or techniques that are not
prohibited aversive interventions. The regulations allow the use of “such interventions as voice
control, limited to loud, firm commands; time-limited ignoring of a specific behavior; token fines
as part of a token economy system; brief physical prompts to interrupt or prevent a specific
behavior; interventions medically necessary for the treatment or protection of the student; or
other similar interventions.”311
New York also provided a “[c]hild-specific exemption to [the] use [of] aversive
interventions” that included both a grandfather clause and a sunset date.312 The grandfather
clause allowed a child’s IEP to include the use of aversive interventions for any school year
subsequent to the 2008-2009 school year only if the child’s “IEP include[d] the use of aversive
interventions as of June 30, 2009.”313 The regulations also permitted the continued use of
aversive interventions, as provided in a child’s IEP, for three academic school years following
309

N.Y. Comp Code R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 19.5(b).
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promulgation of the regulations, up to and including the 2008–2009 school year.314 After the
2008-2009 school year, the regulations sought to ban the use of aversive interventions entirely.315
The regulations allowed the use of aversive interventions pursuant to the child-specific
exemption only when a child “display[ed] self-injurious and/or aggressive behaviors that
threaten[ed] the . . . well being of” either the child or others.316 If the child displayed such
behavior, a panel of experts was required to be convened to approve the use of aversive
interventions for that particular child.317
NYSED submitted the regulations to the United States Department of Education in 2007
and, in June 2007, received a letter that the regulations were substantially consistent with
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See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 289, at *7 (pdf pages 3-4, 7)
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Id. § 200.22(e)(6)(i)–(ii). These provisions of the regulations acknowledge that aversive

interventions are supported by scientific research and can be effective to reduce severe behavior. First, the
regulations provide that any approved aversive interventions must be “implemented consistent with peerreviewed research.” Id. § 200.22(f)(2)(v). Second, the regulations require the panel of experts to
determine either that a “full range of evidence-based positive behavioral interventions have been
consistently employed over an appropriate period of time and have failed to result in sufficient
improvement of a student’s behavior,” or that the child’s behavior “pose[s] significant health and safety
concerns that warrant the use of aversive interventions to effect rapid suppression of the behavior and a
range of nonaversive prevention strategies have been employed and have failed to provide a sufficient
level of safety.” Id. § 200.22(e)(6)(i)–(ii)
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IDEA.318
V. LITIGATION CHALLENGING THE NEW YORK REGULATIONS
A. The Alleyne Litigation
In August 2006, while the emergency regulations were in place, several parents of
students enrolled at the JRC sued NYSED, seeking a temporary restraining order enjoining
NYSED from enforcing the regulations.319 In Alleyne v. New York State Education Department,
all of the children had IEPs that authorized the use of aversive interventions, including the use of
contingent electric shock, to address severe behavior.320
In September 2006, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction and enjoined enforcement of the regulations against those students.321 In October
2006, the district court issued another injunction based on the plaintiffs’ concerns that the
children’s IEPs were not being “revised for the [following] school year” or “were being revised
without parental consent” with the intention of excluding the use of aversive interventions in the
children’s IEPs.322 In a February 2007 hearing, the federal district court issued a further
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injunction enjoining NYSED from enforcing certain revisions that the Department had made in
January 2007 to the state regulations.323 The court expressed concern that the January 2007
revisions, which required that any aversive interventions be implemented by a “licensed or
certified professional,” would in practice discontinue the use of aversive interventions, thereby
circumventing the court’s prior injunction.324
NYSED appealed the court’s February 2007 order.325 The Second Circuit reversed and
remanded on the ground that the district court had not considered “irreparable harm and
likelihood of success on the merits.”326 The defendants then filed motions for summary
judgment, and in 2010, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ summary
judgment motions.327
The court first considered the plaintiffs’ “global” claim that the regulations conflicted
with provisions of IDEA. On that global claim, the court held that the NYSED regulations
represented “a permissible educational policy choice” and that the “prevailing disfavor for
aversive techniques weighs strongly in favor of the validity of the regulations.”328 The court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ “facial attack” on the
regulations as being contrary to the dictates of IDEA.329
323
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In so holding, the court first noted that IDEA “‘does not usurp [a] state’s traditional role
in setting educational policy.’”330 The court found that the regulations, which were designed to
ultimately eliminate all use of aversive interventions in New York, were “consistent with the
IDEA’s focus on positive behavioral modification methods.”331 The court reached this result as a
matter of law even as the court noted that the expert opinions proffered by the plaintiffs were
considerably “more comprehensive than any expert opinion proffered by the defendants.”332
Indeed, the court acknowledged that one of the defendants’ own experts, Dr. Hagopian, had
“conceded that ‘the position that punishment should not be used is more of a philosophical based
type of position,’ and that it is inappropriate to completely ban aversives.”333 Thus, even with the
sworn deposition testimony from one of the defendants’ expert witnesses that the science of
ABA did not warrant a complete ban on aversive interventions, the court nonetheless held that
IDEA’s language endorsing the use of positive behavioral interventions demonstrated that the
defendants were entitled, as a matter of educational policy, to ban aversive interventions.334
However, the court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the
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plaintiffs’ claim that the regulations, as applied to each of them individually, denied them a
FAPE.335 The court held that, on the current record, it could not determine as a matter of law that
the plaintiffs had received a FAPE.336 The court also declined “to dissolve the preliminary
injunction.”337
The Alleyne litigation is ongoing.338 The preliminary injunctions remain in place and, as a
result, the IEPs of those children still can include the use of aversive interventions.339
B. The Bryant Litigation
1. Factual Background
On January 10, 2010, the guardians of seven students residing at the JRC filed suit in
federal district court against NYSED, the Commissioner of Education, and the New York Board
of Regents seeking to enjoin NYSED from enforcing the New York regulations banning the use
of aversive interventions.340 The seven guardians who filed suit were all family members of the
JRC students; six were the parents of a student and one was the aunt of a student.341 The
guardians all alleged that the students were in need of aversive interventions to control, reduce,
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or eliminate problematic behaviors but that none of the students would be able to receive
aversive interventions if the NYSED regulations were enforced.342
The students in the Bryant litigation had been diagnosed with a variety of disorders,
including autism,343 Impulsive Control Disorder (NOS),344 Intermittent Explosive Disorder,345
Bipolar Disorder,346 Oppositional Defiant Disorder,347 Mood Disorder (NOS),348 and other
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Id. at ¶¶ 88–90. The children in the Bryant litigation had not been grandfathered in under the

provisions of the New York regulations because their IEPs had not included a behavior plan that allowed
the use of aversive interventions before June 30, 2009. Id. at ¶82.
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behavior disorders that cause the students to engage in dangerous and disruptive behaviors.349
Those behaviors included repeated head-banging against hard objects;350 using a fingernail to
slice open one’s tongue;351 disrobing in public;352 pulling out one’s own teeth by force;353
destroying physical property (beds, televisions, computers, windows, walls);354 physically
attacking family members (including younger siblings);355 setting fire to a bedroom at home;356
349

Bryant Declaration, supra note 345, at ¶2, George Declaration, supra note 343, at ¶2, Houston-

Josephat Declaration, supra note 343, at ¶2, Pena Declaration, supra note 343, at ¶2, Tam Declaration,
supra note 343, at ¶2, Hughes Declaration, supra note 346, at ¶2, Presley Declaration, supra note 348, at
¶2.
According to the complaint, each student had “a long and well-documented history of severe
behavioral problems, including aggressive, self-injurious, destructive, disruptive and otherwise noncompliant behavior.” Bryant Complaint, supra note 340, at ¶20.
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and assaulting teachers and staff; resulting in broken bones, among other examples.357 These
behaviors resulted in multiple 911 calls, expulsion from public school, emergency placement in
psychiatric hospitals, and other confinements in psychiatric institutions.358
These students also had significant history of behavioral interventions, including early
autism intervention services,359 ABA intervention,360 speech and occupational therapy,361 and
one-to-one staffing, with a crisis professional,362 among others.363
The students had received years of special education services in a variety of educational
settings, both public and private.364 Due to their behaviors, the students had not been able to
remain in restricted, self-contained classrooms in a public school setting; several students were
placed in psychiatric institutions before they were admitted to JRC.365 Other students were either
357
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refused admission or expelled from private residential facilities due to their behavior.366
One student’s history of placements was particularly telling. The student had been placed
in a private residential facility whose therapeutic approach, according to its website,
encompassed “a positive approaches philosophy utilizing behavioral interventions at the micro
and macro levels.”367 The facility sought to expel the student because of the severity of his
behavior.368 When the parents asked that the student remain, apparently because no other
placement was available, the facility required the parents to sign a document not just releasing all
claims against the facility arising from injury to the student, but also agreeing to indemnify the
facility with regard to any claims made against the facility by any person who might be injured
by the child.369 The document stated that “despite every clinical intervention employed to date,
including but not limited to, 24-hour, 1-to-1 supervision, the facility could not keep the child
from engaging in serious self-injurious behavior.370 The child was transferred to the JRC.371
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For three of the seven students, the students’ home school district recommended
placement at the JRC as necessary to provide the student with a FAPE.372 The guardians of three
other students had placed those individuals at JRC without consent of the school district, but the
guardians were able to establish in due process proceedings that placement at the JRC was
necessary to provide the students with a FAPE.373 The guardian of one student also had placed
the student at JRC without prior approval of the student’s public school district and no FAPE
determination had yet been made in any due process proceeding.374
2. The District Court’s Decision in Bryant
Shortly after the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction; the defendants both opposed the motion for preliminary injunction and filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint.375 On August 26, 2010, the federal district court issued an opinion
granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss and denying the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary
injunction.376
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The court first defined an “aversive” intervention in a manner that went far beyond the
specific interventions identified in the New York regulations themselves. Rather, the court
defined an aversive intervention as follows:
Aversive behavior modification techniques rely on consequences that are
carefully designed to decrease a problematic behavior. Aversive interventions are
used on an individualized, specifically–defined basis to treat a student’s
problematic behaviors, including aggressive, dangerous, self–injurious,
destructive, disruptive, and noncompliant behavior. The goal is effective
deceleration or minimization of problematic behaviors, which in turn enables a
student to receive an appropriate education, promotes the student’s safety, and
helps the student develop and hone the basic skills necessary for learning and
daily living.377
Then, with no detailed discussion, “the court deem[ed] controlling the conclusions reached in
Alleyne”—specifically the conclusion made in Alleyne that the New York regulations banning
the use of aversive interventions did not contravene the provisions of IDEA.378
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the regulations deprived the children’s
guardians of a meaningful opportunity to participate in the drafting of each child’s IEP.379 In
support of this argument, the plaintiffs primarily relied on two cases, Deal v. Hamilton County
Board of Education,380 and Kalliope R. v. New York State Department of Education.381 In Deal,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a school district violated the procedural requirements

(2010)).
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of IDEA when it “predetermined” before an IEP team meeting that the school district would not
provide ABA therapy to a child diagnosed with autism.382 In Kalliope, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York denied NYSED’s motion to dismiss a complaint, in
which the plaintiffs had alleged that NYSED had predetermined the contents of children’s IEPs
by issuing regulations that dictated a particular student-teacher class size ratio.383 The court in
Kalliope ruled that the plaintiffs had stated a viable claim that the NYSED regulations might
prohibit the children’s IEP teams from engaging in “an individualized assessment of a given
child,”384 thus violating IDEA’s procedural requirement that parents meaningfully participate in
the IEP process.385
The federal district court in Bryant rejected this argument.386 The court distinguished
Deal and Kalliope on the grounds that they involved questions of permissible teaching methods
and student-teacher ratios respectively, issues that the court deemed, without further explanation,
to be “quite distinct”387 from the use of aversive interventions.388
3. The Second Circuit’s Decision in Bryant
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling granting the
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defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.389 The court identified two claims raised by the
plaintiffs: a procedural claim that the regulations violated the procedural requirements of IDEA
in terms of parental participation in the IEP process and a substantive claim that the regulations
would deprive the children of a FAPE.390
The court first rejected the plaintiffs’ procedural claim that the regulations deprived the
children’s parents of a meaningful opportunity to participate in the IEP process by
predetermining that certain behavioral interventions could not be implemented.391 In so holding,
the court essentially reduced the entire category of aversive interventions to a single process or
method. In particular, the court stated: “[N]othing in New York’s regulation prevents
individualized assessment or precludes educators from considering a wide range of possible
treatments. The regulation prohibits consideration of a single method of treatment without
foreclosing other options.”392 Concluding that the regulations affected just “one possible
method”393 of behavioral intervention, the court found that no predetermination in violation of
IDEA had taken place.394
The court did acknowledge, citing Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i), that IDEA “does not prohibit
alternatives such as aversives.”395 The court, however, ignored the plain text of Section
389
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1414(d)(3)(B)(i), which requires the IEP team to consider both positive behavioral interventions
“and other strategies” to address problem behavior.396 Rather, the court held, without detailed
discussion, that a state regulation “that relies on positive behavioral interventions only is [not]
incompatible with the IDEA.”397
The court then addressed the plaintiffs’ substantive claim that the regulations violated
IDEA’s requirement that each child receive a FAPE.398 The court again rejected the plaintiffs’
claim, principally for two reasons. The court found that plaintiffs’ insistence that the children
required the use of aversive interventions amounted to a claim for an educational program that
would “maximize the children’s potential.”399 Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley,
the court found that the children’s IEPs satisfied the Rowley standard even without the use of
aversive interventions.400
The court also held that NYSED’s decision to ban the use of aversive interventions was a

396
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matter of “education policy,”401 which the court was required to give deference under Rowley.402
Noting that “[t]here is an ongoing debate among the experts regarding the advantages and
disadvantages of aversive interventions and positive-only methods of behavioral
modification,”403 the court characterized itself as “not institutionally suited to now second guess
the policy decision made by experts charged with formulating education policy in New York.”404
Rather, the court held that NYSED could opt for “positive-only methods of behavioral
modification.”405
Judge Richard Sullivan, a federal district judge sitting by designation on the Second
Circuit, dissented from the majority opinion.406 Judge Sullivan criticized the majority’s finding
that the regulations reflect “‘a considered judgment by the State of New York regarding the
education and safety of its children’”407 on the ground that the majority had not credited the
substantial debate in the psychological community about the efficacy of aversive interventions to
treat severe behavior.408 Noting that the case had been decided on a motion to dismiss the
complaint and that the plaintiffs had alleged in their complaint that substantial scientific research
supported the use of aversive interventions to treat severe behavior, Judge Sullivan expressed
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concern that the majority had not undertaken the “searching” review that is required to ensure
compliance with IDEA.409 Judge Sullivan contended that the case should have been remanded to
the district court for the development of a fuller record, including a more detailed review of the
scientific literature pertaining to the use of aversive interventions.410
Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.411 The Court
declined to hear the case.412
VI. THE COURT IN BRYANT MISINTERPRETED IDEA AND THE SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION IN ROWLEY
A. The Second Circuit Ignored Well-Settled Rules of Statutory Construction
IDEA explicitly directs a child’s IEP team to consider both “positive behavioral
interventions and supports” and “other strategies” to address behavior that impedes the child’s
learning.413 “Clearly, IDEA does not prohibit the use of aversives.”414
When the Second Circuit held that NYSED could promulgate regulations that banned415
certain forms of aversive interventions, the court stated: “[I]t cannot be said that a policy that
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relies on positive behavioral interventions only is incompatible with the IDEA.”416 In so holding,
the Second Circuit essentially wrote the phrase “and other strategies” out of the statute.
Well-established rules of statutory construction dictate that whenever the courts interpret
statutory language the courts should choose the interpretation that gives effect to all of the words
of the statute. “A statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some
operative effect.”417 A statute should be interpreted “so that effect is given to all its provisions, so
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”418
The Supreme Court has held that the use of the word “other” in statutory language
indicates Congress’s intent to add to a list of statutorily identified items. In United States v.
Powell, the Supreme Court held that a criminal statute that prohibited the mailing of “pistols,
revolvers and other firearms capable of being concealed on the person” included within the
prohibited items any firearm, in addition to a pistol or revolver, so long as the firearm was
capable of being concealed on a person.419 The Court specifically rejected the argument that the
term “other firearms” was limited to include only the more specific items, pistols and revolvers,
already identified in the statute.420 Similarly, the Court in Duncan v. Walker noted in dicta that a
statute containing the words “post-conviction or other collateral review” required that the phrase
416
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“other collateral review” include a form of review over and above any review identified as “postconviction” review.421
Similarly, the phrase “and other strategies” in IDEA must have a meaning distinct from
the phrase “positive behavioral supports and interventions.” The use of the conjunction “and”
clearly demonstrates that the phrase “positive behavioral interventions and supports” is not
exhaustive. In holding that a policy of “positive-only interventions”422 comports with IDEA, the
Bryant Court simply ignored the clear words of the statute.
Even beyond the plain meaning of the statute, nothing in the legislative history of IDEA
indicates Congress’s intent to ban the use of aversive interventions.423 Indeed, the U.S.
Department of Education interprets IDEA to allow the use of aversive interventions. In a letter
dated January 26, 2010, Education Secretary Arne Duncan stated that “[t]he IDEA emphasizes
and encourages the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports, but does not prohibit
the use of other measures, such as seclusion, non-emergency restraint, or aversive behavioral
interventions, when appropriate to address student behavior.”424
B. The Second Circuit Misapplied the Supreme Court’s Holding in Rowley
The Second Circuit also determined that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley,
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it was required to defer to educators’ choice of one side of this debate about the use of aversive
interventions.425 This determination was incorrect.
In Rowley, the Court discussed at some length the statutory procedural safeguards and,
specifically, the rights and protections afforded to parents and guardians.426 The Court reasoned
that Congress had a specific intent when it included “elaborate and highly specific procedural
safeguards”427 in conjunction with other “general and somewhat imprecise substantive”428
concepts such as the FAPE requirement. The Court determined that Congress had intended to
“place[] every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and
guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process . . . as it
did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard.”429
The Court also clarified the appropriate role of the judiciary in reviewing educators’
judgments about educational policy and teaching methods, noting that the statute granted state
and local education agencies the “primary responsibility . . . for choosing the educational method
most suitable to the child’s needs.”430 The Court then stated that the judiciary lacks “‘specialized
knowledge and experience’ necessary to resolve ‘persistent and difficult questions of educational
policy.’”431 The Court stated that the judiciary must determine only whether the requirements of
425
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the Act have been met and to otherwise leave “questions of methodology” to be resolved by state
educators.432
In articulating its view of the appropriate balance between judicial review and deference
to educators, however, the Court expressly considered that the disputed methodology choice
would have been the subject of an administrative due process proceeding under the statute. In
particular, the Court stated:
The Act expressly charges States with the responsibility [of] . . . ‘adopting, where
appropriate, promising educational practices and materials.’ §1413(a)(3). In the
face of such a clear statutory directive, it seems highly unlikely that Congress
intended courts to overturn a State’s choice of appropriate educational theories in
a proceeding conducted pursuant to §1415(e)(2).433

Indeed, the Court reiterated that any deference is dependent upon a process that ensures
parental involvement on an individual basis, including the rights of parents to initiate due process
432

Id. at 208.
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proceedings in order to contest the proposed educational plan for the child. The Court stated that
“[e]ntrusting a child’s education to state and local agencies does not leave the child without
protection”434 because the Act’s provisions “protect individual children by providing for parental
involvement” both in the development of state plans and policy and “in the formulation of the
child’s individual educational program.”435 Throughout the opinion, the Court emphasized the
substantial procedural rights given to parents, which allows parents both to participate in the
drafting of a child’s educational plan and to challenge the adequacy of any such plan.436
The Court thus clearly contemplated that the judiciary would accord the appropriate level
of deference to methodology choices made by educators only after (a) an educational method had
been selected for a single child whose parents were included in the process of formulating an
IEP; and (b) the choice of educational method could have been subject to further review in an
administrative proceeding. Nothing in the Rowley opinion suggests that the judiciary was
required to defer to methodology choices made via a state agency rule-making process, a process
that contains none of the procedural safeguards of the kind set forth in the Act.437
In the thirty years since Rowley was decided, the lower federal courts have applied this
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deferential review in cases involving disputes between educators and the parents of particular
children.438 The Second Circuit, for example, has cited Rowley repeatedly for the proposition that
administrative hearing officers have primary responsibility for determining whether a proposed
IEP provides a child with a FAPE.439 While the rulings at the administrative level are subject to
an “‘independent’ judicial review,”440 the federal courts are expected to give due weight to the
administrative proceedings. Such deference is “particularly appropriate when the state [hearing]
officer's review ‘has been thorough and careful.’”441
Other federal courts emphasize that deference is the result of educators’ responsibility to
“choos[e] the educational method most suitable to the child’s needs.”442 While the courts do
caution that the judiciary “‘must be careful to avoid imposing [the court's] view of preferable
education methods upon the State,’”443 this level of deference presumes that school officials will
438
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“tailor an educational program to the needs of the child.”444
However, before the Bryant decision, no court had extended the concept of deference to
the circumstances where a state educational agency made methodology choices through
administrative rulemaking rather than an individual decision made when drafting an IEP for a
particular child. The reason is clear: the process by which a member of the public can influence
or object to proposed agency rule-making involves participation rights that are substantially
different and more curtailed than the rights of a parent to challenge the adequacy of a child’s
proposed IEP in an administrative proceeding.445 The right, for example, to “comment on”446
proposed agency rules is wholly unlike a parent’s right to have an impartial hearing before a
single judicial officer in which the parent can be represented by an attorney, present the
testimony of an expert witness, compel the attendance of other witnesses, cross-examine
witnesses, present other evidence, obtain a transcript of the full hearing at no expense, receive a
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written opinion, and have the right to appeal.447
Indeed, when a parent seeks to challenge the authority of an SEA to promulgate
regulations in the field of education, the parent is not required to exhaust the administrative
remedies available under IDEA simply because the nature of the parent’s challenge is the
agency’s implementation of a statewide “policy, not whether a particular IEP is appropriate for a
particular student.”448 Similarly, the New York regulations at issue in the Bryant litigation
constituted a “general prohibition” and a “statewide determination made as a matter of
educational policy,”449 rather than a choice of educational method that was made with regard to
any particular child.
Thus, the Second Circuit simply misapplied Rowley, where the Court expressly
considered that the rights of parents to participate in educational decision-making and to
challenge unsatisfactory choices via the administrative due process procedures were important
components. In the absence of those protections available to contest a methodology choice, no
deference is warranted.
C. The Second Circuit Misunderstood the Science of ABA
Finally, the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Bryant reflects a misunderstanding of the
science of applied behavior analysis and the use of behavioral interventions. In ruling that the
New York regulations did not violate the provisions of IDEA, the Second Circuit characterized
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New York’s policy as approving the use of “positive-only” behavioral interventions.450 The
Court determined that a ban on non-positive behavioral interventions was acceptable, describing
the ban as foreclosing just a “single method of treatment” that is available among many “other
options.”451 By describing a positive-only intervention policy prohibiting just one treatment
option, the Court misapplied or misunderstood at least two important ABA concepts.
First, the Second Circuit apparently did not understand the concept of the least restrictive
or least intrusive alternative.452 When seeking to change behavior of a specific child, the
behavior analyst is to determine which form of intervention will be the least intrusive
intervention that can effectively treat the behavior.453 Consequences-based interventions using
reinforcement are considered less intrusive than consequences-based interventions that use
punishment techniques and, for that reason, the behavior analyst adhering to professional
standards will implement a punishment-based intervention only after less intrusive,
reinforcement-based interventions have failed to produce good results.454 The Second Circuit’s
characterization of non-positive interventions as one method among many appears to reflect a
belief that the interventions are always equally applicable and interchangeable, when that is not
the case.
450
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The Second Circuit’s position that a state can ban the category of “non-positive”455
interventions because it is just a single method of treatment among many treatment options
seems particularly nonsensical when one considers the specific history of the children who were
the subject of the Bryant litigation. Those children had significant histories of multiple
interventions that had been implemented across many different settings for years, yet their severe
problem behavior persisted.456 In essence, the Second Circuit recommended that the children
continue to receive the “positive-only”457 interventions that had been proven to be ineffective in
the past.
The Second Circuit’s decision also is troubling because it does not allow the behavior
analyst to develop a BIP that includes components of both reinforcement-based and punishmentbased interventions. The scientific research repeatedly demonstrates that better outcomes are
achieved when positive reinforcement and punishment interventions are paired together.458 If all
non-positive interventions are prohibited, the behavior analyst cannot design a BIP that includes
elements of both reinforcement and punishment interventions, even if the behavior analyst might
determine that, under ABA principles, a multi-component approach would be most effective to
treat problem behavior.
In dissenting from the majority opinion in Bryant, Judge Sullivan recognized that the
Court lacked sufficient information about the science. Judge Sullivan clearly articulated his
concern that the Court had made a judgment on the science without a complete record or in455
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depth understanding of the science of behavioral interventions.459 His concern was well founded.
The most troubling aspects of the Bryant decision are the Court’s apparent endorsement of a
positive-only intervention policy as being both acceptable under scientific standards and in
compliance with IDEA. In this manner, the Second Circuit truly placed at risk the fundamental
tenet of IDEA—the right of each child to an individualized program designed to meet the child’s
unique needs.460
VII.

PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE IDEA’S LANGUAGE REGARDING BEHAVIORAL
INTERVENTIONS

This debate about the appropriateness of certain behavioral interventions to address
problem behavior of disabled children is ongoing. The recent attempts to pass federal legislation
that would regulate the use of seclusion, restraint, and “aversive behavioral interventions” is a
strong indicator that this topic will be a key issue when Congress next amends and reauthorizes
IDEA.461 Indeed, advocacy groups for both educators and the disabled have highlighted this
issue in position papers and statements regarding upcoming issues for IDEA reauthorization. 462
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Thus, this Section sets forth several steps Congress can take when it amends and reauthorizes
IDEA.
A. An FBA and BIP Should Be Required Whenever Behavior Impedes Learning
The current structure of IDEA requires that an FBA be conducted and a BIP be
implemented only when the child’s behavior has been the subject of disciplinary proceedings
under 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k).463 Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i), which requires the child’s IEP
team to consider behavioral interventions whenever the child’s behavior impedes learning, is
conspicuously devoid of any reference to an FBA or BIP.464 Congress should amend Section
1414(d)(3)(B)(i) to require that an FBA be conducted and a BIP be implemented whenever a
child’s IEP team determines that the child exhibits behavior that impedes learning, even if that
behavior has not been the subject of disciplinary proceedings.
This addition to Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) is necessary for several reasons. First, among
behavior analysts, it is considered standard practice to conduct an FBA whenever a child exhibits
problem behavior.465 By requiring an FBA and BIP in Section 1414(d)(3)(b)(i), Congress will
ensure that each student’s programming conforms to professional practices. In addition, if IDEA
requires that all behavioral interventions be written in a BIP, school staff cannot unilaterally
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implement some inappropriate procedure in the classroom and later claim that the procedure was
a form of behavioral intervention.466 Congress will protect children against such unauthorized
and inappropriate conduct by amending IDEA to require that all behavioral interventions be
contained in a written BIP.
More importantly, however, early assessment in the form of an FBA and early
intervention in the form of a BIP may help to reduce or eliminate problem behavior before it
becomes a discipline issue. Currently IDEA’s disciplinary provisions only apply when the school
seeks to suspend or expel the student or move the student to a different educational setting.467 It
seems nonsensical that the statute would not require an FBA and BIP until a student’s behavior
has escalated to a point where suspension or expulsion is a possibility. Rather, an FBA should be
conducted and, if appropriate, a BIP implemented, whenever the child’s IEP team determines
that the child exhibits behavior that impedes learning.468 By including the requirement for an
FBA and BIP in the statutory provisions that address the various factors that a child’s IEP team
must consider as part of the development of the child’s IEP, the statute will ensure that problem
behavior is addressed at a much earlier stage.
B. The Phrase “Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports” Should Be Deleted from
Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i)
The meaning and emphasis of PBS has changed dramatically since the term “positive

466
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behavioral interventions and supports” first appeared in IDEA in 1997.469 As prominently noted
on OSEP’s pbis.org website, PBS is not a process to devise an appropriate BIP for a particular
child; it is a framework for designing school environments to reduce problem behavior across the
entire student body.470 The reference to PBS, however, appears in the provision of IDEA that
addresses the process by which a specific child’s IEP team develops an IEP for that particular
child.471 It simply makes no sense that a child’s IEP team must contemplate the development of a
school-wide framework, or the institution of school-wide disciplinary policies or procedures,
during the process of developing an IEP for a specific child. For this reason, the phrases should
be stricken from Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i).
If Congress wishes to endorse the PBS framework as a means to improve the school
environment for all children and reduce disciplinary issues on a school-wide basis, it certainly
can express that position in some statutory provision other than Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i). PBS
strategies, such as instituting discipline policies, safe schools initiatives, social skills training,
and anti-bullying and anti-harassment efforts, are all important strategies to improve the school
environment and reduce behavior issues among all students in the community.472 Thus, the
suggestion to delete the language from Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) should not be construed as a
suggestion to abandon the PBS framework. The endorsement of PBS simply belongs elsewhere.
Currently, however, the phrase “positive behavioral interventions and supports” as
469
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contained in Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) causes confusion. Some states have issued poorly worded
statutes or regulations with the mistaken belief that IDEA prohibits any interventions that would
be perceived as “negative” by the child.473 A prime example is Pennsylvania’s definition of
“aversive techniques” as “[d]eliberate activities designed to establish a negative association with
a specific behavior.”474 Under this definition, no child can lose a privilege as a result of engaging
in problem behavior since the loss of privilege is designed to cause that “negative association”475
to occur.
While the Pennsylvania regulations do include examples of prohibited techniques with
which no one would quibble (e.g., “[t]reatment of a demeaning nature”),476 it is quite a logical
leap to say that no BIP should ever include an intervention that would cause the child to establish
a negative association with a specific behavior. There are a myriad of effective punishmentbased interventions that are neither demeaning nor physically painful that would cause a child to
establish a negative association with a specific behavior and thereby reduce the frequency of that
behavior.477 IDEA should allow the use of appropriate behavioral interventions that would cause
a child to make that negative association with the behavior, thereby hopefully reducing the
frequency with which the behavior would occur in the future.
Other state statutes and regulations suffer from similar defects in terms of language used
473
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to describe “aversive interventions.” Nevada’s statutes require that students have a “positive
behavior plan” and “positive behavioral supports.”478 Neither Nevada’s statutes nor its
regulations define the term “positive behavior plan,” although the Nevada Administrative Code
does define the term “positive behavioral supports” as a process to “promot[e] positive changes
in behavior” without using “negative or aversive means.”479 These provisions, like
Pennsylvania’s, also seem to reach too far in prohibiting the use of any intervention that the child
would perceive to be negative.
Banning interventions that cause “discomfort” to the child also may be too vague.480 The
subjective nature of measuring “discomfort” is a poor standard by which to determine whether an
intervention is appropriate. Take, for example, a child who engages in hand mouthing. One
possible positive punishment intervention to reduce the behavior of hand mouthing may be to
require the child to wash his or her hands under cold tap water for a specified length of time after
every instance of hand mouthing. The cold water or prescribed length of time that the child is
required to wash hands might cause some discomfort, yet such an intervention to treat that
problem behavior, which causes no pain or physical harm, should be eminently acceptable.
Effective behavioral interventions that might expose the child to “immediate temporary
discomfort”481 that falls far short of any inhumane, painful, or degrading treatment should not be
prohibited.
With many of these state statutes and regulations, the difficulty lies in using subjective
478
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terms like “positive” and “aversive” to describe behavioral interventions. To eliminate this
problem, Congress should simply remove the phrase “positive behavioral interventions and
supports” from Section 1414(d)(3)(B)(i).
C. The United States Department of Education Should Promulgate Regulations That Define
Prohibited Practices
Although Congress should remove the phrase “positive behavioral interventions and
supports” from Section 1414(d)(B)(3)(i), in amending IDEA, Congress also should authorize the
Department of Education to promulgate regulations that will define certain prohibited practices.
Prohibited practices might include, for example, corporal punishment (e.g., hitting, slapping,
pinching, hair-pulling, extreme physical exercise); treatment of a demeaning nature; withholding
meals, water, sleep, clothing, shelter, or access to bathroom facilities; intentionally altering food
to make it distasteful or inedible; verbal abuse, humiliation or ridicule; or deprivation of
medication, among others.482
In issuing such regulations, the Department of Education should clearly note that these
prohibited practices are not considered “interventions” or even “aversive interventions.” It is
important to remove the label of “intervention” from these practices in order to make clear that
such practices do not conform to the professional and ethical standards and cannot be justified on
the grounds that they embody some approved ABA techniques.
D. The United States Department of Education Should Provide Guidance About Behavioral
Intervention Practices
In addition to issuing regulations that would identify prohibited practices, the U.S.
Department of Education also should issue guidelines for implementing behavioral interventions.
482
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The Utah State Office of Education has created a comprehensive document that could serve as a
good template.483
The Utah guidelines begin by describing the manner in which PBS principles can be
implemented to set clear expectations for student behavior throughout the entire school
community.484 The guidelines stress that, when PBS strategies are implemented, the frequency of
discipline and behavior issues across the school population can be greatly reduced.485
Yet the Utah guidelines also provide great detail about the process of conducting an FBA
and implementing a BIP to address the target behavior of a specific child.486 The Utah guidelines
incorporate the principle of least restrictive interventions, stating that interventions should be
chosen on the continuum so that the first interventions selected are the least intrusive.487 The
guidelines also provide recommended practices for implementing and monitoring the use of
“highly intrusive interventions,” including operationally defining the target behavior and an
appropriate replacement behavior, collecting baseline data before implementing the
interventions, training staff in the use of the intervention, collecting data, and re-evaluating if the
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intervention fails to reduce the frequency of the behavior.488
Perhaps the most valuable information contained in the Utah guidelines is a section that
uses the PBIS website pyramid to rank behavioral interventions into each of the three categories:
primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention.489 At each level, the guidelines specifically identify
the pertinent behavioral interventions and, for each intervention, the guidelines describe how the
intervention can be implemented, any special considerations in implementing the intervention
(including any potential side effects or “downsides”), information about data collection, and
outside resources and references that will provide additional information about each
intervention.490
Included with the recommended interventions at both the secondary and tertiary levels
are punishment-based interventions such as the use of verbal reprimands, time-out, and
overcorrection.491 Included within the level of tertiary prevention are interventions such as the
use of intrusive substances and stimuli like water mist, taste aversion, “forceful physical
guidance,” mechanical restraint, inhibiting devices (e.g., a helmet).492 The guidelines provide
that for each of these interventions parental consent should be obtained and a behavioral expert
should be included on the child’s IEP team.493
488

Id. at 28–29.

489

Id. at 31–32 (referring to the categories as “all” “some” and “few”).

490

Id. at 31–53 (primary level interventions), 54–69 (secondary level interventions), 70–82 (tertiary

level interventions).
491

Id. at 55.

492

Id. at 71.
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Id.
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If the United States Department of Education chooses to create guidelines similar to the
Utah guidelines, there will be some difficult decisions to make. While some punishment-based
interventions, such as the use of time-out (from reinforcement), overcorrection, response cost or
response blocking may not be controversial, other punishment-based interventions, particularly
the use of water mists, aromatic sprays, and contingent electric shock, will be controversial.494
Resolution of the propriety of using highly intrusive interventions to address severe self-injurious
and aggressive behavior will require extensive input from behavior analysts, educators, and
parents, among others. The issue will require a thoughtful, extensive discussion that fully
explores the moral, legal, and ethical considerations in order to arrive at some consensus as to
procedures, if any, for the use of highly intrusive interventions. This Article does not make any
specific recommendations in that regard, but offers the following thought.
It is a sobering truth that some children exhibit severe behavior that endangers their lives
and isolates them from their family, even as family members miss their children terribly and
mourn their children’s inability to live freely in their communities. While some of the proposed
interventions are difficult to contemplate, they can be effective to reduce severe self-injurious
and aggressive behavior. It is for this reason that some behavior analysts consider contingent
electric shock to be a permitted intervention in appropriate circumstances.495 Whatever the
outcome of the discussion, all participants should put the rhetoric aside and presume that every
other participant in the discussion seeks only to find the best solution for difficult and intractable
494

Id.

495

See Brown, supra note 139, at 217 (26.9% of ABA experts would recommend contingent electric

shock); COOPER, supra note 21, at 334–50 (discussing contingent electric stimulation); Michaels, supra
note 139, at 98 (9.7% of PBS experts would recommend contingent electric shock).
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problems.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Treating severe behavior in disabled children is a complex task. In addressing such
behavior, educators should not be constrained to select only those interventions subjectively
viewed as “positive.” If a particular intervention will effectively reduce the problem behavior
and does not involve inhumane or undignified treatment, then the intervention should be
implemented even if it involves a punishment-based consequence.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Bryant, by erroneously interpreting IDEA to allow a
state to implement a positive-only intervention scheme, only serves to complicate the process by
which interventions may be deemed appropriate for any particular child’s behavior. When
Congress next amends and reauthorizes IDEA, it should clarify the particular statutory
provisions so that children with severe behavior have access to the appropriate interventions that
they need.
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